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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM D. BLODGETT and 
FLORENCE G. BLODGETT, his wife, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, 
Defendant, 
STANLEY L. PACE and ALLAN D. 
McCOMB, individually and 
d/b/a ALCO INVESTMENT, 
Defendants-Appellants, 
and DOES 1-10, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 86-0115 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON THE APPEAL 
I. Whether this appeal should be dismissed for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction because Appellants are doing business under 
an assumed name not registered to them? 
II. Whether Appellants, as judgment creditors, can reach the 
interest in real property of which their judgment debtor has been 
deprived in a prior quiet title action in which a lis pendens had 
been recorded against the property? 
III. Whether Appellants, as purported assignees of a judgment 
creditor whose judgments against one co-maker of a promissory 
note whose judgment has been discharged by the other co-maker can 
execute on their assignment? 
STATUTES AND RULES 
Pursuant to Rule 24(f) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, the following statutes and rules have been set forth 
in the Addendum ("Ad.") to this brief: 
Addendum Page 
Utah Code Annotated §15-4-3 1 
Utah Code Annotated §42-2-5 1 
Utah Code Annotated §42-2-10 1 
Utah Code Annotated §78-40-2 2 
Utah Rules of Evidence 201(a),(b),(d),(f) 2 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 60(a) 3 
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REQUEST TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE 
The Plaintiffs-Respondents request that this Court take 
judicial notice of pleadings, orders, decisions, exhibits and 
opinions in other related actions not already part of the record 
in this case, deeds and an explanatory letter from counsel to a 
party below pursuant to Rule 201 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.* 
Copies of the relevant materials are annexed in the Addendum to 
this Brief and made a part hereof by this reference. The materi-
als are indexed at the first page of the Addendum for the conven-
ience of the Court.** 
* Rule 201 provides in part: 
(a) Scope of Rule. This rule governs only 
judicial notice of adjudicative facts. 
(b) Kinds of Facts. A judicially noticed fact 
must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in 
that it is either (1) generally known within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) 
capable of accurate and ready determination by 
resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably 
be questioned. 
• * * 
(d) When Mandatory. A court shall take 
judicial notice if requested by a party and 
supplied with the necessary information. 
* * * 
(f) Time of Taking Notice. Judicial notice 
may be taken at any stage of the proceeding. 
** The original copy of the brief contains a number of 
certified copies, some of which are on legal-sized paper, thus 
making the original somewhat cumbersome. The other copies of the 
brief, including those served on opposing counsel, contain copies 
of the documents reduced to standard size. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. The Parties* 
William D. Blodgett and his wife Florence G. Blodgett 
(the "Blodgetts") were owners of property in Salt Lake County 
which they seek to protect from foreclosure by Alco Investment 
("Alco"), whose partners are Stanley L. Pace ("Stanley Pace") and 
Allan D. McComb ("McComb"). 
Although Stanley Pace and McComb purport to be partners 
under the name Alco Investment (R.60 11 3, R. 71 11 3), the records 
of the Department of Business Regulation, Division of Corpora-
tions and Commercial Code do not list them as current registrants 
of the name "Alco Investment". The Division of Corporations and 
Commercial Code reports that Allan D. McComb and Colleen C. 
McComb filed an application to do business under an assumed name, 
DBA Alco Investment, on September 22, 1976. Their DBA expired 
September 22, 1984, as shown by a Certificate from the Director, 
Division of Corporations and Commercial Code. (Ad. 4-5.) 
Alco's foreclosure efforts began in 1985 and were made 
pursuant to an assignment of a judgment lien from Zions First 
National Bank ("Zions") to Alco after Zions had received payment 
of a default judgment on a promissory note made by Lorin N. Pace 
("Lorin Pace"), father of Stanley Pace, and Betty Purcell (aka 
"Betty Purcell Alexander" or "Betty Purcell Martsch" and some-
times spelled "Pursell"). Zions did not receive payment from co-
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maker Betty Purcell. Zions is not a party to this appeal and 
stated in its answer to the complaint that: 
18. Zions affirmatively alleges that it 
claims no interest in the subject property. 
(R. 68 11 18.) 
2. The Underlying Facts. 
This case is the culmination of some fifteen years of 
transactions and six court proceedings, including an appeal to 
this Court, in which various persons and entities have claimed an 
interest in the Blodgetts1 land. 
The Blodgetts1 problems began in 1971 when Raco Car 
Wash Systems ("Raco"), whose president was Betty Purcell, falsely 
represented to a bank that two tracts of Blodgett land could be 
used as security for a loan to Raco. The Blodgetts had agreed 
with Raco that only one tract could be used as security but were 
deceived into signing papers covering two. They have been trying 
to recover their property ever since. 
The Blodgetts brought two earlier actions arising from the 
unauthorized actions encumbering their land. Zions brought three 
court proceedings because Betty Purcell and her former attorney 
Lorin Pace defaulted on their promissory note to Zions. After 
Lorin Pace paid $27,262.59 under his default judgment on August 
31, 1984, Zions purportedly assigned its judgments against Betty 
Purcell to Alco. Alco then attempted to foreclose on the 
Blodgetts1 property because of Betty Purcell1s prior but extin-
guished interest in the property. The Blodgetts thus brought this 
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action, seeking to resolve their property problems once and for 
all. 
The undisputed facts leading to this action are set 
forth in numbered paragraphs. The facts are documented in court 
files, judgments, title documents and deeds and other such 
sources. Because of the length and complexity of the facts, a 
chronological list of the pertinent events, matters of public 
record, is set forth in the Addendum. (Ad. 6-9.) This Court may 
draw all legal conclusions justified by such facts. See e.g * , 
Betenson v. Call Auto and Equip. Sales, 645 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah 
1982) ("It is well established that where the issue is solely one 
of law, . . . this Court is as capable of determining the ques-
tion as the trial court. . . " ) . 
1. In 1969, the Blodgetts owned two adjacent tracts of 
land located at approximately 6100 South Highland Drive in Salt 
Lake County, Utah. The Blodgetts operated a grocery store on the 
larger tract (the "Store Tract"). They leased the smaller tract 
(the "Car Wash Tract") to Raco for the installation of a car wash 
in early 1969. The lease agreement with Raco provided that the 
Blodgetts would pledge the Car Wash Tract as security for a loan 
to Raco to finance the car wash installation. Raco, acting 
through its president Betty Purcell, made arrangements for the 
loan with Valley Bank and Trust Company ("Valley Bank"). (Record 
["R."] 78, 79, 93.) 
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2. Without the Blodgetts1 knowledge and prior to clos-
ing the loan, Valley Bank advised Raco that it required addition-
al security in order to make the loan for the installation of the 
car wash. Raco falsely advised Valley Bank that the Blodgetts 
had agreed that both their Store Tract and the Car Wash Tract 
could be used as security for Raco's loan. (R. 79, 93.) 
3. Valley Bank prepared a trust deed granting it a 
security interest in both the Car Wash Tract and the Store Tract. 
In addition, without first discussing the matter with either Raco 
or the Blodgetts, Valley Bank prepared a promissory note in its 
favor for signature by the Blodgetts as co-makers. (Id.) 
4. On November 5, 1971, the Blodgetts attended the 
Raco loan closing at Valley Bank's offices. They intended to 
execute documents necessary for the hypothecation of the Car Wash 
Tract alone. The only commitment the Blodgetts had made to any-
one concerning the use of any of their real property as security 
until the moment of closing was the one contained in the Raco 
lease? Valley Bank had a copy of the lease. (Id.) 
5. Although Valley Bank usually explained the terms of 
loan documents to borrowers unless they demonstrated some degree 
of sophistication, it offered the Blodgetts no explanation of the 
contents of the trust deed and, in particular, failed to call 
attention to the trust deed's departure from a material provision 
of the Raco lease: that only the Car Wash Tract would be used as 
security for Raco's loan. (Id.) 
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6. Valley Bank personnel spent half an hour explaining 
the documents to Betty Purcell, although neither she nor her 
corporation was making any contribution to the real property 
collateral for the loan. Valley Bank personnel made no similar 
effort to explain the loan documents to the Blodgetts even though 
the Blodgetts announced that they did not understand them. (R. 
80, 93-94.) 
7. When the Blodgetts asked about the promissory note. 
Valley Bank falsely advised them that by executing the loan docu-
ments the Blodgetts assumed only a secondary or "stand-by" obli-
gation. The Blodgetts requested copies of all loan documents for 
review; however, Valley Bank sent them a copy of the promissory 
note only. (R. 80, 94.) 
8. The Raco loan went into default; but Vcilley Bank 
did not notify the Blodgetts or suggest to them that the Store 
Tract was in jeopardy. (Id.) 
9. Valley Bank foreclosed on the Store Tract in 
1973. To effectuate the foreclosure, Valley Bank utilized Wayne 
Ashworth ("Ashworth") as trustee. (Id.) 
10. Ashworth failed to comply with the procedures 
prescribed for non-judicial foreclosure of trust deeds in Utah. 
Ashworth held a public trustee's sale which the Blodgetts 
attended. By reason of their misconception that only the Car 
Wash Tract was subject to sale, the Blodgetts failed to take the 
most elementary steps to protect their interests. For example, 
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they did not require Ashworth to sell the property in separate 
tracts or in a particular sequence. Moreover, the Blodgetts did 
not enter a bid even though the high bid was a small fraction of 
the property's value. The high bidder at the sale was Joe 
Martsch, a director of Raco and Betty Purcell's husband at the 
time. (R. 80, 81, 94.) 
11. Neither Ashworth nor Valley Bank consulted with, 
advised, or sought instruction from the Blodgetts before or 
during the sale. Both acted purely in Valley Bank's interest and 
took the course of action most likely to assure that Valley Bank 
would either be paid in full or acquire the tracts at a bargain 
price. (Id.) 
12. On November 11, 1973, Joe Martsch conveyed a one-
half undivided interest in the Store Tract to Water Park 
Corporation ("Water Park"), a corporation wholly owned by Betty 
Purcell. (_Idk) Lorin Pace witnessed and notarized the 
conveyance. (Ad. 10.) 
13. The Blodgetts first became aware that the Store 
Tract had been included in the sale when Joe Martsch asserted his 
rights of ownership after the sale. In 1974 the Blodgetts 
brought suit to obtain the return of the Store Tract in the Third 
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Civil No. 223407, 
against Joe Martsch, Betty Purcell aka Betty Purcell Martsch, 
Doyle Nease, Raco Car Wash Systems, Inc., a Utah corporation, 
Wayne A. Ashworth, trustee, Carl W. Tenny, Valley Bank & Trust 
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Company, and First Security Bank of Idaho, N.A. ("Blodgett I"). 
The Blodgetts also recorded a lis pendens on November 4, 1974 
with the Salt Lake County Recorder in Book 3714, at Page 334, 
giving notice that they had filed Blodgett I to terminate the 
interests of all of those defendants in and to the Store Tract. 
(R. 81, 82, 98, 99.) Lorin Pace represented Raco and Betty 
Purcell. See Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298, 300 (Utah 1978). 
14. The Blodgett I defendants moved for summary judg-
ment. The trial court (per Baldwin, J.) granted the motion, and 
the Blodgetts appealed. This Court reversed and remanded 
Blodgett I for trial on December 26, 1978. Blodgett v. Martsch, 
supra, 590 P.2d at 304. 
15. On or about January 16, 1976, while Blodgett I was 
still pending, Zions filed an action in the Third Judicial 
District Court, Salt Lake County, against Betty Purcell, a 
defendant in Blodgett I, and Lorin Pace, seeking judgment for 
$27,262.59 on their unpaid promissory note. Zions First National 
Bank v. Betty Pursell [sic] Alexander and Lorin N. Pace, Civil 
No. 232782, ("Zions I"). (R. 82.) A copy of the promissory note 
from Lorin Pace and Betty Pursell to Zions is annexed. 
(Ad. 12.) Zions alleged, inter alia: 
2. On or about the 7th day of July, 
1971, at Salt Lake City, Utah, the defendants 
[Purcell and Lorin Pace], and each of them, 
made, executed and delivered their promissory 
note to the plaintiff [Zions], in the amount 
of $27,262.59, payable on demand at Salt Lake 
City, Utah. . . . (R. 9 11 2. ) 
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16. On March 3, 1916, Zions obtained a default judg-
ment in Zions I against Lorin Pace in the amount of $31,064.52. 
(Ad. 31.) Fifteen days later, on March 18, 1976, Lorin Pace 
filed a Motion For Leave To Withdraw As Counsel for Betty Purcell 
(but not for Raco) in Blodgett I. (Ad. 13.) 
17. On August 13, 1976, Zions obtained a default judg-
ment in Zions I against Betty Purcell in the amount of $31,064.52. 
(R. 82.) 
18. Water Park, to which Joe Martsch had conveyed a 
one-half undivided interest in the Store Tract in 1973, was 
administratively dissolved September 30, 1977. An order of the 
trial court in Zions I (per Durham, J.) concluded that Water 
Park's assets had become the undivided property of Betty Purcell 
upon the dissolution of Water Park on September 30, 1977. Thus, 
according to that order, Betty Purcell was the owner of record of 
a one-half undivided interest in the Store Tract (conveyed from 
Joe Martsch to Water Park) as of September 30, 1977. (R. 15; see 
11 24 below.) 
19. In 1978, the Blodgetts brought a second action in 
the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, against 
Betty Purcell and Water Park, seeking to terminate Betty 
Purcell1s and Water Park's interest in the Store Tract. Blodgett 
v. Betty Purcell aka Betty Purcell Martsch and Water Park 
Corporation, Civil No. C78-8017, ("Blodgett II") . (R. 15.) 
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20. On March 13, 1979, Zions brought a second action 
in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, against 
Betty Purcell for the purpose of enforcing the judgment obtained 
against her in Zions I. Zions Bank v. Purcell, Civil No. C79-
1685, ("Zions II"). (Ad. 14-15.) 
21. On April 11, 1979, the trial court (per Durham, 
J.) consolidated Blodgett I and Blodgett II for trial. (Ad. 16-
17.) 
22. On May 1, 1979, the trial court in Blodgett I and 
Blodgett II (per Durham, J.) entered an order on default against 
Water Park, conveying all right, title and interest of Water Park 
in and to the Store Tract to the Blodgetts. (R. 83, 100, 101, 
Ad. 18-21.) 
23. On May 2, 1979, the trial court in Zions I (per 
Durham, J.) set aside Zions1 August 13, 1976 default judgment in 
the amount of $31,064.52 against Betty Purcell. (R. 83.) 
24. On May 16, 1979, Zions obtained an order in Zions 
II (per Durham, J.) determining that Water Park owned the Store 
Tract, that Betty Purcell was the sole shareholder of Water Park, 
that Water Park had been dissolved on September 30, 1977, and 
that Betty Purcell became the owner of the subject real property 
on September 30, 1977 by virtue of the dissolution. The order 
stated further that: 
"Any judgment lien [Zions] may have against 
defendant [Purcell] which is properly dock-
eted in the office of the Salt Lake County 
Clerk constitutes a lien upon the above-
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described property [the Store Tract] as of 
the date of such docketing if subsequent to 
September 30, 1977. If any such judgment is 
docketed prior to September 30, 1971, such 
judgment shall constitute a lien commencing 
September 30, 1977. (R. 84.) 
Zions had no judgment against Betty Purcell on the date Judge 
Durham entered this order. The Blodgetts were not parties or 
participants in Zions I or Zions II. (R. 83, 84.) 
25. On or about May 29, 1979, Joe Martsch quitclaimed 
all interest he had in the Car Wash Tract and in the Store Tract 
to the Blodgetts, thus conveying to them his one-half undivided 
interest in the Store Tract and his interest in the Car Wash 
Tract. (R. 84, 102, see also Ad. 10.) 
26. On June 1, 1979, Zions obtained a second default 
judgment against Betty Purcell in Zions I. The amount of the 
judgment was $27,262.59 — $3,801.93 less than the amount of the 
original default judgment Zions had obtained against her. (R. 
84.) 
27. On December 7, 1979, the trial court in Blodgett I 
and Blodgett II (per Baldwin, J.) held a pretrial hearing during 
which the parties settled both cases. The terms of the settle-
ment were read into the record. (R. 84, 85, 103-07.) 
28. On December 7, 1979, Judge Baldwin entered an 
order in Blodgett I and Blodgett II (the "Settlement Order") 
approving the settlement reached at the pre-trial hearing. A 
certified copy of the December 7, 1979 Minute Order in Civil No. 
223407 is annexed. (Ad. 22.) 
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29. The terms of settlement approved in the Settlement 
Order provided for: (1) execution of quitclaim deeds by the 
defendants in Blodgett I and Blodgett II conveying the Store 
Tract to the Blodgetts; (2) payment of damages to the Blodgetts; 
(3) dismissal with prejudice of the Blodgetts' actions; (4) a 
court order quieting title to the Store Tract in the Blodgetts. 
(R. 103-07.) 
30. On January 15, 1980f Betty Purcell executed a 
quitclaim deed and delivered it to the Blodgetts pursuant to the 
terms approved in the Settlement Order. (R. 109-12.) 
31. On May 5, 1980, the trial court (per Baldwin, J.) 
entered an order (the "Dismissal Order") dismissing Betty Purcell 
as a defendant in Blodgett I and Blodgett II. The Dismissal 
Order did not include all of the terms of the settlement read 
into the record at the pre-trial hearing before Judge Baldwin. 
(R. 85.) 
32. In 1984 Zions commenced an action in the Third 
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, to renew its Zions I 
judgments ("Zions III"). Zions First National Bank v. Lorin N. 
Pace, No. C84-0299. (See Ad. 11.) After Zions III was filed, 
Lorin Pace, father of Appellant Stanley Pace, paid Zions 
$27,262.59, on August 31, 1984, for amounts due under the 
judgment against him. (R. 85, 86.) Counsel for Zions confirmed 
the payment by Lorin Pace in a letter dated August 18, 1986, a 
copy of which is annexed. (Ad. 11.) The letter substantiates and 
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explains Zions' averment in its answer in this case that it makes 
no claim to the subject property. (R. 68.) 
33. On or about August 31, 1984, Zions purportedly 
assigned its judgment of May 16, 1979 in Zions I and its judgment 
of June 2, 1979 in Zions II to Alco. (See R. 85, 86.) Alco's 
DBA expired approximately three weeks later on September 22, 
1984. (Ad. 4-5.) 
34. On April 19, 1985, the Blodgetts received an in-
formal notice to enforce lien from Alco. The notice stated that 
Alco intended to execute on any judgment lien received by it from 
Zions. (R. 86.) 
35. On May 24, 1985, the Blodgetts brought the instant 
action ("Blodgett III") against Zions, Stanley Pace, McComb and 
Alco to quiet title to the Store Tract in the Blodgetts. The 
Blodgetts also recorded a lis pendens. (Id.) 
36. On January 16, 1986 the trial court (per Sawaya, 
J.) entered an order in Blodgett III granting the Blodgetts1 
motion for summary judgment. (R. 134-37.) The judgment states: 
Therefore, the court hereby orders, ad-
judges and decrees that: 
1. The Motion for Summary Judgment of 
defendants, Stanley L. Pace and Allen D. 
McComb dba Alco Investment, is denied. 
2. The Motion of plaintiffs as against 
all defendants, Zions First National Bank, 
Stanley L. Pace and Allen D. McComb dba Alco 
Investment, is granted as follows: 
a. The judgment liens that arise on 
behalf of the defendant, Zions First National 
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Bank, within the civil actions known as Zions 
Bank vs. Purcell and Pace, Civil No. 232782 
[Zions I] and Zions Bank vs. Purcell, Civil 
No. C79-1685, [Zions II], filed in the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, which judgment liens and their 
underlying judgments have been assigned to 
defendants, Stanley L. Pace and Allen D. 
McComb, dba Alco Investment, are void and of 
no effect as against the real property that 
is the subject of this action, [the Store 
Tract] identified as [description omitted]. 
b. Title to the above-identified 
real property is quieted in the plaintiffs 
[the Blodgetts] as against any and all right, 
title, or interest claimed by the defendants, 
Zions First National Bank and Stanley L. Pace 
and Allen D. McComb dba Alco Investment. 
(R. 135-37.) 
37. On August 13, 1986, the trial court in Blodgett I 
and Blodgett II (per Dee, J.) entered an order (the "Order and 
Judgment of Quiet Title") granting the Blodgetts' unopposed 
Motion to Set Aside Order of Dismissal and Enter Judgment of 
Quiet Title. The Blodgetts filed the motion on March 17, 1986 to 
correct a clerical error in the Dismissal Order to accord with 
the settlement that had been read into the record and approved by 
the trial court (per Baldwin, J.). Even though not required to 
do so, the Blodgetts personally served Betty Purcell with a copy 
of the motion. (Ad. 23.) The Order and Judgment of Quiet Title 
provide: 
The court being fully advised in the 
premises and having considered the Motion of 
plaintiff hereby orders, adjudges and 
decrees: 
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1. The Order of Dismissal against 
defendant Betty Purcell, aka Betty Purcell 
Martsch, signed and entered May 5, 1980 by 
the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., is 
hereby set aside. 
2. Judgment is hereby entered against 
Betty Purcell, aka Betty Purcell Martsch, 
quieting Title of all right, title and inter-
est of said defendant within the following 
identified real property in and to the plain-
tiffs' , William D. Blodgett and Florence G. 
Blodgett. The real property to which this 
quiet title judgment applies is located 
within Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and 
is more particularly identified as: 
[description omitted]. 
This Order shall relate back to and be 
effective as of May 5, 1980. 
The Complaint of plaintiffs against defen-
dants Betty Purcell Martsch, Raco Car Wash 
Systems, Inc., and Water Park Corporation is 
hereby dismissed with prejudice and any and 
all counter-claims of said defendants are 
hereby dismissed with prejudice with the 
parties to bear their own costs. 
The sum of $2,400 on deposit with the court 
in this case be paid over to plaintiffs by 
the clerk of the court. 
A copy of the Order and Judgment of Quiet Title is annexed. (Ad. 
23-25.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The facts underlying this action are undisputed and 
support the trial court's decision for the Blodgetts. 
2. Since Alco is not registered with a DBA, it could 
not file a Notice of Appeal; consequently, this Court lacks 
jurisdiction over the appeal and should affirm without proceeding 
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to the merits. Utah Code Ann. §42-2-5; Utah Dept. of Bus. Reg. 
Etc. v. Public Serv. , 602 P.2d 696 (Utah 1979). 
3. By an order of the trial court (per Durham, J.), 
Betty Purcell was determined to be the owner of Water Park's 
interest in the Store Tract as of September 30, 1977. The 
Blodgetts had filed a lis pendens on the Store Tract in their 
suit against her in 1974; thus anyone seeking a lien against 
Betty Purcell1s property after September 30, 1977 was precluded 
by the doctrine of lis pendens, which protects the right, title 
and interest of the Blodgetts. Betty Purcell's judgment 
creditors could obtain no interest in the property from her 
because of the Blodgetts1 lis pendens. Utah Code Ann. §78-40-2; 
Tuft v. Federal Leasing, 657 P.2d 1300 (Utah 1982); Bagnall v. 
Suburbia Land Co., 579 P.2d 914 (Utah 1978); Stearns v. Los 
Angeles City School District, 244 Cal.App.2d 696, 53 Cal.Rptr. 
482, 21 A.L.R.3d 164 (1966); Hoyt v. American Traders, Inc., 76 
Or.App. 253, 709 P.2d 1090 (Or.App. 1985), appeal pending, 713 
P.2d 1058 (Or. 1986). 
4. Since a co-maker of a promissory note discharged a 
judgment against him and his co-maker, his remedy is against the 
co-maker, who was, like him, a judgment debtor. Thus, the Zions 
assignment to Alco (taken after one judgment debtor paid the 
judgment) does not permit foreclosure on land in which the non-
paying co-maker once had an interest. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT SHOULD DISMISS ALCO'S APPEAL FOR LACK OF SUBJECT 
MATTER JURISDICTION. 
After Lorin Pacef judgment debtor to Zions on his 
promissory note, paid Zions, Alco took an assignment and then 
gave notice of foreclosure on the Store Tract. Alco's notice 
prompted this suit, which the Blodgetts won on summary judgment.* 
* Alco argues at some length that summary judgment should 
not have been granted to the Blodgetts because it was supported 
by an affidavit based on information and belief concerning 
business and attorney-client relationships between Lorin Pace and 
Betty Purcell. This Court may take judicial notice of the 
documents upon which the affidavit was based. First, Lorin Pace 
is a maker of a promissory note with Betty Purcell to Zions dated 
July 7, 1971 for the amount of $27,262.59 payable on demand. 
(Ad. 12.) Zions subsequently took a default judgment against 
Lorin Pace for non-payment of the note on March 3, 1976. (Ad. 
31.) He paid Zions $27,262.59 pursuant to that judgment on 
August 31, 1984. ( Ad. 11.) The Court may properly infer that, 
when a person signs a promissory note with another person, there 
is some relationship between them. Since the relationship 
evidenced by a promissory note involves money and debt, that 
relationship may be presumed to involve business. 
As to an attorney-client relationship between Lorin Pace and 
Betty Purcell: Lorin Pace appears as attorney of record for 
Betty Purcell in Blodgett I from 1974 to 1976, when there was a 
motion for leave to withdraw as of counsel. (Ad. 13.) He was an 
attorney for the defendants and respondents, including Betty 
Purcell, in the Blodgett's appeal to this Court in Blodgett I. 
Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298, 300 (Utah 1978). Also, on 
November 8, 1973, Joe Martsch, Betty Purcellfs husband at the 
time Valley Bank foreclosed on the property, conveyed a one-half 
undivided interest in the Store Tract to Water Park, which was 
solely owned by Betty Purcell. Lorin Pace witnessed and 
notarized the Martsch deed. (Ad. 10.) These documents evidence 
an attorney-client relationship between Lorin Pace and Betty 
Purcell and demonstrate that Lorin Pace was or had reason to be 
familiar with Betty Purcellfs corporate holdings and business. 
As her attorney in Blodgett I he knew that the Blodgetts had 
filed a lis pendens on the Store Tract. 
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Utah Code Ann. §42-2-5 requires persons who carry on, 
conduct or transact business under an assumed name to register 
that name with the Division of Corporations and Commercial Codef 
to maintain a registered office and to appoint a registered agent 
to receive process. Stanley Pace and Allan D. McComb have no 
registration of Alco Investment as an assumed name under which 
they conduct or transact their business, and they have not other-
wise complied with the provisions of Chapter 2 of Title 42, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended. Alco's registration expired 
September 22, 1984, before Alco attempted to foreclose on the 
Blodgetts' land. 
Utah Code Ann. §42-2-10 establishes penalties for 
failure to register assumed names and provides: 
Any person or persons who shall carry on, 
conduct or transact any such business under 
an assumed name without having complied with 
the provisions of this act shall not sue, 
prosecute or maintain any action, suit, 
counterclaim, cross complaint or proceeding 
in any of the courts of this state until the 
provisions of this chapter have been complied 
with. (Emphasis added). 
Thus, persons who fail to register their assumed names and have 
otherwise failed to comply with Chapter 2 of Title 42 are legally 
incompetent to participate as parties litigant in any of the 
courts of this state, including this Court. 
In Utah Dept. of Bus. Reg. Etc. v. Public Serv., 602 
P.2d 696, 699 (Utah 1979), this Court stated: 
Generally, a court's lack of jurisdiction 
over the subject matter of a dispute may not 
-20-
be waived by the parties, and may be raised 
by the court sua sponte. Likewise, a court 
may not, when moved by an inclination to 
reach the merits of a particular case, ignore 
the fact that the case falls outside its 
legally proscribed domain. 
This Court should dismiss any action pending before it when it 
lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of a dispute. 
The jurisdiction of this Court in appeals taken from 
the district courts, such as the instant proceeding, depends upon 
the timely filing of a notice of appeal with the Clerk of the 
District Court under Rule 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
To file such a notice, a party must be legally competent to sue, 
prosecute or maintain actions in Utah courts. 
Alco and its partners are not legally competent to 
prosecute their appeal before this Court. It follows, therefore, 
that being incompetent to prosecute or maintain their appeal, the 
notice of appeal they filed was void; and, the time for appeal in 
this matter having expired long ago, this Court is now without 
subject matter jurisdiction to proceed further and determine the 
merits of this case. Accordingly, the Court should dismiss the 
appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 
II. THE RIGHTS OF ZIONS (AND CONSEQUENTLY ANY RIGHTS OF ITS 
ASSIGNEE ALCO) TO THE STORE TRACT WERE EXTINGUISHED BY THE JUDG-
MENTS AND ORDERS RENDERED IN BLODGETT I AND BLODGETT II; ACCORD-
INGLY, THE TRIAL COURT IN BLODGETT III PROPERLY ENTERED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT QUIETING TITLE TO THE STORE TRACT IN THE BLODGETTS. 
Although the Blodgetts respectfully submit that this 
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to examine the merits of 
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this appeal, they believe that the facts are such that the trial 
court's judgment in their favor must be affirmed. Although the 
underlying facts are extensive and the law somewhat complex, 
careful analysis demonstrates that the Blodgetts are proper 
owners of the Store Tract because of the doctrine of lis pendens 
recognized in Utah and elsewhere. 
A. By Virtue Of The Doctrine Of Lis Pendens, Zions And 
Alco Are Bound By The Trial Court's Disposition Of The Store 
Tract Pursuant To The Terms Of The Settlement Order In Blodgett I 
And Blodgett II. 
In their brief, the Appellants state: 
In any case, when Judge Durham decided on 
May 16, 1979 that Betty Purcell had owned the 
property since September 30, 1977, it was 
conclusively established that Water Park had 
no interest in the property on May 1, 1979 
when the Blodgetts obtained their default 
judgment against Water Park. 
(App. Br. p. 8) . 
If, as Judge Durham recognized and held in Zions II, 
ownership in Betty Purcell (through Water Park, which had a one-
half undivided interest from Joe Martsch) was conclusively 
established as of September 30, 1977, then Zions took its 
judgment against Betty Purcell and sought to file a judgment lien 
against the Store Tract after the Blodgetts' lis pendens had been 
filed in a suit in which Betty Purcell was named as a 
defendant. That lis pendens covered any interest in the property 
which Betty Purcell had. Consequently, any claim of Zions 
against Betty Purcell1s interest in the property is subject to 
the lis pendens and was extinguished as against that property 
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when the Blodgetts prevailed in their suits against Betty 
Purcell. Accordingly, summary judgment was properly granted to 
the Blodgetts in Blodgett II. 
The Blodgetts recorded a lis pendens on the Store Tract 
on November 4, 1974. The order in Zions II vested a one-half 
undivided interest in the Store Tract in Betty Purcell, which was 
immediately subject to the Blodgetts' original claim and lis 
pendens. Since the August 13, 1976 default judgment againt Betty 
Purcell in Zions I had been vacated, Zions had no judgment 
against Betty Purcell on the date that Judge Durham recognized 
Betty Purcell1s one-half undivided ownership of the Store 
Tract. Zions acquired no colorable claim against Betty Purcell's 
interest in the Store Tract until June 1, 1979, when it obtained 
a default judgment against her. (Even if that default judgment 
were to relate back to September 30, 1977, it is still subsequent 
to the Blodgetts' 1974 lis pendens.) Thus, by virtue of the 
doctrine of lis pendens, Zions (and consequently Alco as its 1985 
assignee) is bound by the trial court's disposition of Betty 
Purcell's interest in the Store Tract to the Blodgetts pursuant 
to the terms of the Settlement Order entered in Blodgett I and 
Blodgett II. Since Zions never sued Joe Martsch, it had no claim 
against him, and the one-half interest in the Store Tract which 
he conveyed to the Blodgetts has been theirs without rightful 
claim by Betty Purcell, Zions or now its assignee Alco since the 
Martsch conveyance. 
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1. After A Lis Pendens Is Filed In A Quiet Title 
Action, Judgment Creditors Of The Defendants Therein Cannot Reach 
The Interest Of Which Their Judgment Debtors Are Deprived By A 
Judgment In The Quiet Title Action. 
Alco's attempt at foreclosure is exactly what the 
doctrine of lis pendens prevents: when Betty Purcell was ordered 
to quitclaim her interest to the Blodgetts, in whom title was to 
be quieted, that court-ordered conveyance to the Blodgetts left 
Betty Purcell with no interest in the Store Tract to which a 
judgment lien could attach. 
Lis pendens means, simply, that even though Alco may 
have a right against Betty Purcell, Alco cannot claim any right 
to property in which Betty Purcell no longer has any right, title 
or interest. Alco can only stand in Betty Purcell's shoes; it 
cannot exceed her interests in any property. Since she has no 
interest in the Store Tract, lis pendens mandates that Alco has 
no interests in it. If Alco has a bona fide claim against Betty 
Purcell, it must sue her personally or seek assets she owns 
against which to satisfy its claim. 
Utah Code Annotated §78-40-2 governs the filing of lis 
pendens in actions affecting the title to or the right of pos-
session of real property in Utah. This provision states: 
In any action affecting the title to, or 
the right of possession of, real property the 
plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint 
or thereafter, and the defendant at the time 
of filing his answer when affirmative relief 
is claimed in such answer, or at any time 
afterward, may file for record with the re-
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corder of the county in which the property of 
some part thereof is situated a notice of the 
pendency of the action, containing the names 
of the parties, the object of the action or 
defense, and a description of the property in 
that county affected thereby. From the time 
of filing such notice for record only shall a 
purchaser or encumbrancer of the property 
affected thereby be deemed to have construc-
tive notice of the pendency of the action, 
and only of its pendency against parties 
designated by their real names. 
In Bagnall v. Suburbia Land Co., 579 P.2d 914, 916 
(Utah 1978), this Court explained the doctrine of lis pendens: 
The doctrine of lis pendens preserves the 
status quo by keeping the subject of the 
lawsuit within the power and control of the 
court until judgment or decree shall be 
entered. The recording of a lis pendens 
serves as a warning to all persons that any 
rights or interests they may acquire in the 
interim are subject to the judgment or 
decree. One who acquires an interest in land 
that is the subject of pending litigation 
stands in no better position than the person 
he acquires it from, he is charged with 
notice of the claimed contrary rights of 
others, and he is bound by the judgment 
rendered in the litigation* (Emphasis 
added). 
In Bagnall, United Paint & Colors Company ("United 
Paint") acquired a certain tract of property from Utah Valley 
Land & Development Company ("Utah Valley"). Prior to the execu-
tion and delivery of the deed to United Paint by Utah Valley, the 
Bagnalls had recorded a lis pendens on the tract. Nonetheless 
Utah Valley executed and delivered a deed to United Paint. The 
Bagnalls named Utah Valley and United Paint as parties in a suit 
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to quiet title to the property. The trial court ruled that the 
Bagnalls were entitled to a decree quieting title against Utah 
Valley and, consequently, United Paint. The Court held: 
The final undisputed fact is that the 
default judgment entered against Utah Valley 
(thereby quieting title in Bagnalls as 
against it) was previously affirmed on appeal 
to this Court. This event, coupled with the 
fact that a lis pendens was recorded, serves 
to conclusively defeat any interest United 
Paint may have acquired through Utah Valley. 
This is the case by reason of the doctrine of 
lis pendens which requires United Paint to 
stand in the same position of its grantor, 
Utah Valley. Consequently, when the inter-
ests of Utah Valley in the 140.15 acres were 
defeated, so were those of United Paint* 
Bagnall, supra, at 916, 917 (emphasis added). 
In Tuft v. Federal Leasing, 657 P.2d 1300, 1302-03 
(Utah 1982), this Court reaffirmed the principles announced in 
Bagnall and held: 
In the present case, the lis pendens 
document gave constructive notice to both 
Bayshore Inn and Federal Leasing of the 
pendency of the foreclosure suit. Both 
parties, in acquiring the property, were 
therefore charged with the knowledge that 
their rights with respect to the property 
would be determined by that suit. 
Because Bayshore Inn and Federal Leasing 
had both actual and constructive notice of 
the pendency of the foreclosure suit at the 
time they acquired their successive interests 
in the property, they are bound by the re-
sults of that suit. The trial court properly 
quieted title in plaintiff on that basis. 
(Emphasis added). 
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Thus, after a lis pendens has been recorded in a quiet 
title action, a lis pendens grantee cannot reach the interest of 
which its grantor is deprived by a judgment in the quiet title 
action. Zions was trying to obtain Betty Purcell's interest in 
the land, but the Blodgetts1 lis pendens, filed in connection 
with a suit against Betty Purcell, was constructive notice to 
Zions that any claim to the land it could make because of or 
through Betty Purcell was subject to an existing dispute between 
the Blodgetts and Betty Purcell. Zions1 assignee Alco thus has 
no right against the Blodgetts or their property, and the summary 
judgment for the Blodgetts in this action should be affirmed. 
Judgment creditors are bound by the application of the 
doctrine of lis pendens. Zions, as a judgment creditor of Betty 
Purcell, could not take something Betty Purcell could not take 
from the Blodgetts; as assignee of Zions, Alco is a judgment 
creditor pursuing a defendant who has lost its assets in a 
suit. The losing defendant Betty Purcell has nothing, and that 
is what her judgment creditor can get: nothing. See Stearns v. 
Los Angeles City School District, 244 Cal.App.2d 696, 53 
Cal.Rptr. 482, 21 A.L.R.3d 164 (1966); Hoyt v. American Traders, 
Inc., 76 Or.App. 253, 709 P.2d 1090 (Or.App. 1985), appeal 
pending, 713 P.2d 1058 (Or. 1986). A copy of the Hoyt case is 
annexed. (Ad. 26-30.) 
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I 
*
n
 Stearns, Rose Landier had been awarded certain real 
property pursuant to a judgment against her former husband, 
Felicien P. Landier, in a divorce action in which she had filed a 
lis pendens. She had filed her lis pendens before the husband's 
judgment creditors recorded their judgment against the property. 
She brought an action to quiet title to the real property against 
Mr. Landier's judgment creditors. Discussing the effect of the 
lis pendens filed in Rose Landier's suit against her ex-husband, 
the California Court held: 
The only mention of [the judgment cred-
itors of Felicien P. Landier] in the property 
is a finding which notes that since the com-
mencement of the action an abstract of judg-
ment had been recorded against the property 
for a sum in excess of $300,000. 
A lis pendens having been recorded prior 
to the abstract, the latter [the judgment 
creditors] could not directly reach the 
interest of which [Felicien P.] Landier and 
the Company were deprived by the judgment in 
Rose's suit. 
53 Cal.Rptr. at 503 (emphasis added, citations omitted). 
In Hoyt v. American Traders, Inc., supra, Ms. Hoyt 
filed an action for a declaratory judgment that a parcel of real 
property which was awarded solely to her in a divorce proceeding 
was free and clear of a judgment lien filed against her former 
husband. In connection with her divorce action, Ms. Hoyt had 
filed a lis pendens before American Traders, Inc., the husband's 
judgment creditor, obtained its judgment against him and before 
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it recorded the lien against her real property. The lower court 
entered judgment in favor of American Traders, Inc. On appeal, 
the Oregon Court of Appeals reversed and held: 
We hold that the doctrine of lis pendens 
was applicable to plaintiff's [Hoyt's] disso-
lution proceeding, as a result of which 
defendant's [American Traders, Inc.'s] judg-
ment lien was subject to the outcome of that 
proceeding. When plaintiff was awarded the 
property free of her husband's interest, 
defendant lost its lien. 
Hoyt, supra, 709 P.2d at 1093 (emphasis added). 
Thus, after a lis pendens has been recorded in a quiet 
title suit, the defendants' judgment creditors cannot, by there-
after recording their judgment, reach the interest which their 
judgment debtors lost in the quiet title action. Whether the 
final orders and judgments are rendered after a trial on the 
merits or pursuant to compromise and settlement is immaterial and 
does not affect the binding nature of those judgments and orders. 
See e.g. Milton E. Giles & Co. v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & 
Savings Ass'n., 47 Cal.App.2d 315, 117 P.2d 943 (1941). 
The Blodgetts are like Ms. Landier and Ms. Hoyt. The 
Store Tract belongs to the Blodgetts, awarded in settlement of 
their suits against Betty Purcell. Like the judgment creditors 
in Stearns and Hoyt, Zions (and hence its assignee Alco) lost its 
lien (if it ever truly had one) against the Store Tract, and 
therefore can take nothing from the Blodgetts. 
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2. Betty Purcell Was Deprived Of Her Interest In 
The Store Tract In Blodgett I And Blodgett II. 
Under the principles stated in Bagnall, Tuft, Stearns 
and Hoyt, the Blodgetts1 lis pendens, filed in 1974, served as a 
warning to Zions (and thus its assignee Alco) that any rights or 
interest it might acquire in, to or against the Store Tract 
(through Betty Purcell) during the pendency of the Blodgetts' 
actions would be subject to any and all judgments or orders ren-
dered in the Blodgetts' proceedings. 
On December 7, 1979, Judge Baldwin entered the Settle-
ment Order in Blodgett I and Blodgett II which provided: "Based 
on stipulation of respective counsel, court orders: the within 
case settled as set out in the record." (Ad. 22.) The Settle-
ment Order memorializes and clarifies the intent of the trial 
court. The terms of settlement approved by the Settlement Order 
were: 
MR. BUSHNELL [attorney for the Blodgetts]: 
We'll get the quit-claims we want signed, you 
get the releases and satisfactions you want 
signed. Why don't you prepare the release 
you want for the bank and get the check and 
we'll go from there. Will that be all right? 
THE COURT [Judge Baldwin]: A dismissal with 
prejudice of the action. 
MR. BUSHNELL: We'll prepare the dismissal. 
MR. BARKER [attorney for Betty Purcell]: If 
you want quit-claim deeds, we are going to 
mail them to Idaho and get them back. This 
is a few days mail time. 
MR. BUSHNELL: Lets get all of it done plus 
that— well — 
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MR. BARKER: If you can do it by the Court 
Order and quiet title to the matter — 
MR. BUSHNELL: Let's get the deed too. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. BARKER: Very good. 
(R. 103-07, emphasis added.) 
Thus, the terms of settlement in Blodgett I and 
Blodgett II, which the trial court approved in the Settlement 
Order, included: (1) execution of a quitclaim deed by Betty 
Purcell conveying her interest in the Store Tract to the 
Blodgetts, (2) payment of damages to the Blodgetts, (3) dismissal 
with prejudice of the Blodgetts1 actions, (4) a court order 
quieting title to the Store Tract in the Blodgetts. 
Under the terms of settlement approved by the Settle-
ment Order in Blodgett I and Blodgett II, Betty Purcell, a 
defendant in Zions I and Zions II and through whom Zions and Alco 
claim an interest in the Store Tract, relinquished and was judi-
cially deprived of any interest she had in the Store Tract. The 
Settlement Order disposed of the Store Tract by approving Betty 
Purcell's transfer of the Store Tract to the Blodgetts pursuant 
to quitclaim deeds. In accordance with the law as set forth in 
Bagnall, Tuft, Stearns and Hoyt, Zions and Alco are bound by the 
trial court's disposition of the Store Tract in Blodgett I and 
Blodgett II. 
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This result follows from the fact that both Zions and 
its assignee Alco had constructive notice of the Blodgetts1 liti-
gation through the Blodgetts1 lis pendens filed in November, 1974 
— two years prior to Zions I and the judgments obtained therein 
and four years prior to Zions II. 
When Betty Purcell lost her interest in the Store Tract 
under the Settlement Order in Blodgett I and Blodgett II, Zions 
and Alco lost any interest and claim to the Store Tract because 
their only claims were to Betty Purcell's interest in the Store 
Tract, not in the Store Tract itself. That distinction is 
crucial but ignored by Alco. The trial court, following the 
doctrine of lis pendens explained by this Court, recognized these 
principles. Consequently, the trial court in Blodgett III 
properly entered summary judgment quieting title to the Store 
Tract in the Blodgetts. 
B. The Trial Court's Disposition Of The Store Tract 
Pursuant To The Terms Of The Order And Judgment Of Quiet Title In 
Blodgett I And Blodgett II Extinguished Any Interest Or Claim Of 
Zions And Alco In Or To The Store Tract. 
Since Zions and its assignee Alco were subject to the 
trial court's disposition of the Store Tract in Blodgett I and 
Blodgett II, and since the final Order and Judgment of Quiet 
Title in those cases quieted title to the Store Tract in the 
Blodgetts, Zions and Alco have absolutely no claim against, title 
to, or interest in the Store Tract. Accordingly, the trial court 
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in Blodgett III properly entered summary judgment quieting title 
to the Store Tract in the Blodgetts. 
1. The Trial Court In Blodgett I And Blodgett II 
Properly Entered The Order And Judgment Of Quiet Title Pursuant 
To Rule 60(a) Of The Utah Rules Of Civil Procedure. 
The Dismissal Order did not accurately reflect the 
trial court's judgment, set forth on the record in Blodgett I and 
II and in its minute order to quiet title in the Blodgetts. To 
correct the error in the Dismissal Order, the Blodgetts served 
Betty Purcell and filed on March 17, 1986 a Motion to Set Aside 
Order of Dismissal and Enter Judgment of Quiet Title pursuant to 
Rule 60(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides: 
Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or 
other parts of the record and errors therein 
arising from oversight or omission may be 
corrected by the court at any time of its own 
initiative or on the motion of any party and 
after such notice, if any, as the court 
orders. 
In Stanger v. Sentinel Sec* Life Ins. Co., 669 P.2d 
1201, 1206 (Utah 1983), this Court construed Rule 60(a), defining 
a clerical mistake as one which is mechanical in nature, is 
apparent on the record and does not involve a legal decision or 
judgment by an attorney. The distinction between a judicial 
error and a clerical error does not depend upon who made it; 
rather, the distinction depends on whether it was made in render-
ing the judgment (judicial error) or in recording the judgment as 
rendered (clerical error). See Richards v. Siddoway, 24 Utah 2d 
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314, 471 P.2d 143, 145 (1970). Corrections contemplated by Rule 
60(a) must be undertaken for the purpose of reflecting the actual 
intention of the court and the parties. See Lindsay v. Atkin, 
680 P.2d 401, 402 (Utah 1984). 
Under the criteria set forth in Stanger, Richards and 
Lindsay, the omission of the quiet title provisions in the 
Dismissal Order constituted a "clerical error". The error was 
mechanical in nature, and it occurred in the course of recording 
a judgment, since the court ordered "quiet title" but the subse-
quent written judgment neglected to recite those exact words. 
Making the correction did not involve a legal decision or judg-
ment by an attorney; the correction arose naturally from the 
plain words of the record when the settlement was approved by 
Judge Baldwin. That settlement reflected what the Blodgetts had 
sought all along. The trial court corrected the error on August 
13, 1986 to reflect the actual intention of the trial court and 
the parties as set forth in the record and the Settlement Order, 
quieting title to the Store Tract in the Blodgetts as of the date 
of the settlement. 
In Meagher v. Equity Oil Co., 5 Utah 2d 196, 299 P.2d 
827 (1956), this Court reviewed a case in which the trial judge 
signed an order on the erroneous assumption that the order, as 
prepared by counsel, correctly reflected his judgment in the 
matter. This Court held that the execution of the order was a 
mistake of a perfunctory or a clerical nature since the order did 
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not accurately reflect the result of the trial court's judgment 
and that the trial court could and properly did correct the error 
upon its own motion. 
In Blodgett I and Blodgett II, Judge Baldwin, like the 
trial judge in Meagher, executed the Dismissal Order on the erro-
neous assumption that it correctly reflected his judgment, thus 
making an error perfunctory and clerical in nature and properly 
correctable by the Blodgetts' Rule 60(a) motion and under the 
principles announced in Stanger, Richards, Lindsay and Meagher. 
2. Alco's Erroneous Citation Of Authority Deprives 
It Of Any Support For Its Argument That It Is Not Bound By Orders 
And Judgments Entered In Blodgett I And Blodgett II. 
Although Alco recognizes the binding effect of the 
Blodgetts' 1974 lis pendens (see App. Brief, p. 9.), it argues 
that because the Dismissal Order in Blodgett I and Blodgett II 
did not contain provisions quieting title in the Blodgetts it is 
not precluded from reaching and executing on the Store Tract. To 
support its position, Alco cites 54 C.J.S., Lis Pendens, §39(b), 
quoting only the following language: 
. . . a lis pendens purchaser is not 
bound where there is an agreed judgment not 
based on the relief relied on in the suit, 
. . . (Emphasis added). 
(See App. Brief at 9.) 
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The actual language from 54 C.J.S., Lis Pendens, §39(b) 
at 612 gives Alco absolutely no authority or support for its 
position. The sentence from 54 C.J.S. at 612, actually and 
correctly reads: 
Also, a lis pendens purchaser is not 
bound where there is an agreed judgment not 
based on the grounds for relief relied on in 
the suit, or where the parties by agreement 
include in the judgment lands not referred to 
in the pleadings. (Emphasis added). 
Thus, according to C.J.S., it is only when a judgment 
is entered pursuant to a compromise and settlement that is not 
based on the grounds relied upon in the suit that a lis pendens 
purchaser is not bound by the judgment. It is therefore inconse-
quential whether the return of the property to the plaintiff is 
effected by a judgment quieting title or a judgment authorizing 
the return of the property pursuant to quitclaim deeds, and 54 
C.J.S. would not argue to the contrary so long as the grounds for 
the result are the same as those pleaded. 
In Blodgett I and Blodgett II, the Blodgetts sought to 
terminate the named defendants' interest in the Store Tract on 
the grounds that the defendants in those actions held title to 
the Store Tract improperly and unlawfully. At no time have the 
Blodgetts ever changed the grounds for the relief they sought. 
The settlement approved on the record reflected their position 
and thus is not defeated by Alco's unsupported argument. 
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III. BECAUSE LORIN PACE DISCHARGED THE JUDGMENTS OBTAINED BY ZIONS 
AGAINST BETTY PURCELL IN ZIONS I AND ZIONS II, ZIONS AND ALCO HAVE 
NO JUDGMENT LIEN OR CLAIM TO ENFORCE AGAINST THE STORE TRACT. 
In Zions I, Zions obtained a judgment against Lorin 
Pace in the amount of $31,064.52, which included $27,262.59 (the 
amount of the promissory note, see Ad. 12) plus interest and 
attorney fees. Thereafter, on August 13, 1976, Zions obtained a 
default judgment in Zions I against Betty Purcell for the same 
amount. 
On May 2, 1979, the trial court set aside Zions1 judg-
ment against Betty Purcell in Zions I. On June 1, 1979, Zions 
obtained a second judgment against Betty Purcell for $27,262.59, 
which does not include interest or attorney fees. Notwithstand-
ing the existence of two judgments, (one against Lorin Pace and 
the second against Betty Purcell, the two makers of the note), 
Zions had only one debt for $27,262.59 due and owing to it, and 
that is all Zions ever claimed (except interest and attorney 
fees). Zions purportedly assigned two judgments to Alco: the 
May 16, 1979 judgment against Betty Purcell and the June 1, 1979 
judgment for $27,262.59 against Betty Purcell. 
Lorin Pace's liability to Zions arose from his status 
as a co-maker on a promissory note, as alleged by Zions in its 
complaint. Lorin Pace never answered that complaint but per-
mitted a default to be entered against him. The allegations in 
Zions I, having never been disputed, must be taken as true. 
Since he was a co-maker of the note, Lorin Pace's payment to 
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Zions satisfied the judgment against Betty Purcell. He also 
satisfied all but $3,801.93 of the judgment against him in Zions 
I_. Although Zions has not filed a satisfaction of judgment 
pursuant to Rule 58B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Lorin 
Pace's payment to Zions nevertheless discharged Betty Purcell's 
obligations. These facts are undisputed. 
The Utah law of Obligations, Utah Code Ann. §15-4-3, 
provides: 
The amount of value of any consideration 
received by the obligee from one or more of 
several obligors, or from one or more of 
joint or of joint and several obligors, in 
whole or in partial satisfaction of their 
obligations shall be credited to the extent 
of the amount received on the obligation of 
all co-obligors to whom the obligor or 
obligors giving the consideration did not 
stand in the relation of a surety. 
Since Lorin Pace satisfied the judgments obtained by 
Zions against Betty Purcell, Zions had absolutely nothing to 
assign to Alco. Consequently, Alco took nothing by virtue of the 
Assignment of Judgments. 
Having satisfied Betty Purcell's liability under the 
promissory note for which she was jointly and severally liable, 
Lorin Pace's only remedy, which he seems to have given to his 
son's partnership, is to seek contribution from Betty Purcell, 
not to take property from the Blodgetts. Lorin Pace could re-
cover payment from the Blodgetts only if he were an accommodation 
party and surety and only if Betty Purcell had an interest in the 
Store Tract. 
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Nothing in the records of any of the cases related to 
this proceeding demonstrates that Lorin Pace acted as an accommo-
dation party or surety in executing the promissory note on which 
Zions based its default judgments against Betty Purcell and him 
as co-makers. 
The use of the Assignment of Judgment between Zions and 
Alco is nothing more than a thinly veiled attempt to place Lorin 
Pace in the position of an accommodation party or surety at the 
Blodgetts' expense. Lorin Pace's remedy is against Betty Purcell 
or property she now owns. This Court should not permit Lorin 
Pace either directly or indirectly to reach the Store Tract. For 
whatever reason, Lorin Pace and Betty Purcell entered their loan 
agreement with Zions, but Lorin Pace cannot now, some 15 years 
after he signed the note, remedy a grievance against Betty 
Purcell by letting his son try to take land from the Blodgetts. 
See Utah Code Ann. §15-4-3; Edmond v. Fairfield Sunrise Village, 
Inc., 132 Ariz. 142, 644 P.2d 296 (Ariz. App. 1982); Litwin v. 
Barrier, 6 Kan.App.2d 182, 626 P.2d 1232 (Kan. App. 1981) and 
cases and authorities cited therein. 
Betty Purcell's corporation, Raco, set the Blodgetts up 
for a loss in 1971 by representing to Valley Bank without the 
Blodgetts1 knowledge or acquiescence that Valley Bank could take 
a security interest in the Store Tract; Valley Bank sent the 
Blodgetts only a promissory note and not the full documentation 
on the loan, and Valley Bank's appointed trustee did nothing to 
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protect the Blodgetts at the sale when Betty Purcell's former 
husband was the high bidder on the property. 
Lorin Pace and Betty Purcell made their promissory note 
to Zions July 7, 1971. (See R. 9 11 2; Ad. 12) Lorin Pace was 
thus already associated with Betty Purcell at the time Raco 
authorized Valley Bank to use all of the Blodgetts1 property as 
security for Raco's loan. The Blodgetts attended the closing on 
the Raco loan which they unwittingly secured on November 5, 
1971. Lorin Pace notarized the document by which Joe Martch, 
Betty Purcell's former husband, quitclaimed a one-half undivided 
interest in the Store Tract to Betty Purcell's wholly owned 
company Water Park. Lorin Pace, as attorney defending Betty 
Purcell in the Blodgett I quiet title proceeding, had actual 
notice of the Blodgetts' 1974 lis pendens. As a co-defendant in 
the Zions I suit on his promissory note, he must have known that 
Zions took a default judgment against Betty Purcell. He must 
have expected such a development when he withdrew as her counsel 
in Blodgett I, and it is likely that he knew when he paid the 
judgment in 1984 and his son's unregistered partnership took an 
assignment of his co-maker's judgment on the same date. 
Consequently, Lorin Pace and Alco, like Zions through which they 
attempt to trace a right to the property, are subject to the 
Blodgetts' lis pendens, just as Betty Purcell was. See Bagnall, 
supra, 579 P.2d at 916; Utah Code Ann. §15-4-3. 
Alco's foreclosure attempts should never have been 
made. The Blodgetts have gone through enough trouble already to 
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protect their rights to the Store Tract; the merits of this case 
require that the judgment in their favor be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Blodgetts respectfully 
request that this appeal be dismissed, that the judgment rendered 
by the trial court in their favor be affirmed, that the Court 
take judicial notice of the record and documents in the prior 
actions, that they be awarded their costs, disbursements and 
counsel fees on this action, that they be awarded such other and 
further relief as may be just and proper and that, after more 
than a decade of costs and harrassment, title in the Store Tract 
be quieted in them. 
DATED: September 2, 1986 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
By 
Lester A. Perr^f 
Attorneys for WILLIAM D. 
BLODGETT and FLORENCE 
G. BLODGETT, Plaintiffs-
Respondents 
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED: STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RULES 
15-4-3. Payments by co-obligor. 
The amount or value of any consideration received by 
the obligee from one or more of several obligors, or from one or 
more of joint or of joint and several obligors, in whole or in 
partial satisfaction of their obligations shall be credited to 
the extent of the amount received on the obligation of all co-
obligors to whom the obligor or obligors giving the consideration 
did not stand in the relation of a surety. 
42-2-5. Certificate of assumed and of true name - Contents -
Execution - Filing. 
Every person or persons who shall carry on, conduct, or 
transact business in this state under an assumed name, whether 
such business be carried 6n, conducted, or transacted as an 
individual, association, partnership, corporation, or otherwise, 
shall file with the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code 
a certificate setting forth the name under which such business 
is, or is to be carried on, conducted, or transacted, and the 
full true name, or names of the person or persons owning, and the 
person or persons carrying on, conducting, or transacting such 
business, the location of the principal place of business, and 
the post-office address, or addresses of such person or persons. 
Such certificate shall be executed by the person or persons 
owning, and the person or persons carrying on, conducting, or 
transacting such business, and shall be filed not later than 30 
days after the time of commencing to carry on, conduct, or trans-
act said business. 
42-2-10. Penalties. 
Any person or persons who shall carry on, conduct or 
transact any such business under an assumed name without having 
complied with the provisions of this act shall not sue, prosecute 
or maintain any action, suit, counterclaim, cross complaint or 
proceeding in any of the courts of this state until the pro-
visions of this chapter have been complied with. 
l 
78-40-2. Lis pendens. 
In any action affecting the title to, or the right of 
possession of, real property the plaintiff at the time of filing 
the complaint or thereafter, and the defendant at the time of 
filing his answer when affirmative relief is claimed in such 
answer, or at any time afterward, may file for record with the 
recorder of the county in which the property or some part thereof 
is situated a notice of the pendency of the action, containing 
the names of the parties, the object of the action or defense, 
and a description of the property in that county affected there-
by. From the time of filing such notice for record only shall a 
purchaser or encumbrancer of the property affected thereby be 
deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the action, 
and only of its pendency against parties designated by their real 
names. 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Rule 201. Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts. 
(a) Scope of Rule. This rule governs only judicial 
notice of adjudicative facts. 
(b) Kinds of Facts. A judicially noticed fact must be 
one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) 
generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial 
court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by 
resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. 
* * * 
(d) When Mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice 
if requested by a party and supplied with the necessary informa-
tion. 
* * * 
(f) Time of Taking Notice. Judicial notice may be 
taken at any stage of the proceeding. 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 60. Relief from Judgment or Order 
(a) Clerical Mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, 
orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising 
from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any 
time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and 
after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the 
pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before 
the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter 
while the appeal is pending may be so corrected with leave of the 
appellate court. 
THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION, DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS AND COM-
MERCIAL CODE CERTIFIES THAT attached is a full, true and correct 
copy of the Application To Transact Business Under An Assumed 
Name, DBA for ALCO INVESTMENT, filed with this office on 
September 22, 1976, by ALLAN D. MCCOMB and COLLEEN C. MCCOMB. 
Said DBA expired on September 22, 1984> 
P i l e #20794 
AS APPEARS OF RECORD IN THE DIVISION OFFICE. 
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF EVENTS 
1969 Blodgetts lease Car Wash 
Tract to Raco and agree to 
pledge that tract only for 
loan to finance installation 
07/07/71 
11/05/71 Blodgetts close loan with 
Valley Bank, unknowingly 
pledge Car Wash Tract and 
Store Tract, sign note 
Lorin Pace and Purcell 
make demand note to Zions 
($27, 262,59) 
Raco defaults on loan 
1973 Valley Bank via Ashworth, 
Trustee, forecloses both 
tracts; Purcell's 
Martsch bids high 
tracts 
ex-husband 
for both 
10/12/78 Trustee deed issued to Martsch 
11/08/73 
11/04/74 
01/16/76 
Martsch claims ownership to 
Blodgetts 
Martsch coveys 1/2 intrest in 
Store Tract to Purcell's Water 
Park; Lorin Pace notarizes quit 
claim deed 
Blodgetts sue Purcell, Martsch 
and others, file lis pendens 
(Blodgett I) 
Summary judgment against 
Blodgetts who appeal 
Zions sues Purcell and 
Lorin Pace for demand note 
(Zions I) 
6 
Date 
Blodgett Transactions 
and Suits 
Zions/Pace/Purcell/Alco 
Transactions and Suits 
03/03/76 
08/13/76 
09/30/77 
1978 
03/13/79 
04/11/79 
05/01/79 
05/02/79 
05/16/79 
Water Park is dissolved; 
Purcell takes its assets, 
becomes owner of Store Tract 
Utah Supreme Court orders 
trial in Blodgett I 
Blodgetts sue Water Park and 
Purcell to terminate their 
interests in Store Tract 
(Blodgett II) 
Blodgett I and Blodgett II 
consolidated for trial 
Default order conveys rights 
of Water Park in Store Tract 
to Blodgetts 
Zions takes default 
against Lorin Pace 
($31,064.52) 
Zions takes default 
against Purcell 
($31,064.52) 
Zions sues Purcell to 
enforce judgment in 
Zions I (Zions II) 
Default in Zions I against 
Purcell vacated 
Zions obtains order that 
Water Park was dissolved; 
Purcell, as sole owner, 
took its assets to become 
sole owner of Store Tract 
on Water Park's 
dissolution Sept. 30, 
1977; Zions may docket 
lien against Store Tract 
effective September 30, 
1977 
Date 
Blodgett Transactions Zions/Pace/Puree 11/Alco 
and Suits Transactions and Suits 
05/29/79 
06/01/79 
12/07/79 
01/15/80 
05/05/80 
1984 
08/31/84 
08/31/84 
09/22/84 
04/19/85 
05/24/85 
Martsch quitclaims 1/2 
interest in Store Tract 
to Blodgetts 
Blodgett I and _TI_ settled 
a) quit claims on record: 
on Store Tract to Blodgetts; 
b) damages to Blodgetts; 
c) quiet title to Blodgetts; 
d) suits dismissed with 
prej udice 
Purcell, Raco, Water Park 
quitclaim interest in 
Store Tract to Blodgetts 
Dismissal order in Blodgett I 
and 1^ (corrected 8/13/86 to 
match terms in record of 
December 7, 1979) - title 
quieted to Blodgetts 
Alco notifies Blodgetts of 
intent to execute judgment 
against Store Tract 
Blodgetts sue Zions, S. Pace, 
McComb and Alco (Blodgett III); 
Blodgetts file lis pendens 
Zions denies interest in 
Store Tract 
Zions takes second 
default against Purcell 
in Zions I ($27,262.59) 
Zions renews judgment 
against Lorin Pace and 
Purcell (Zions III) 
Lorin Pace pays Zions 
$27,262.59 (face amount 
of note) 
Zions assigns judgment t 
Alco 
Alco dba expires and not 
renewed 
Blodgett Transactions Zions/Pace/Purcell/Alco 
Date and Suits Transactions and Suits 
01/16/86 Blodgetts obtain summary 
judgment against Alco et 
al.; appeal taken 
08/13/86 Trial court corrects clerical 
error in judgment, effective 
May 5, 1980 to quiet title in 
Blodgetts 
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25S10C? QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
JOSEPH MARTSCH grantor 
of Heyburn , County of Mini doc a , State of jfckxk, hereby 
QUIT CLAIM S to WATER PARK CORPORATION, a Utah Idaho 
Corporation, 
grantee 
of Sa l t Lake City. Utah, for the wm of 
TEN DOLLARS A3D OTHER CONSIDERATION DOLLARS, 
A one-half undivided i n t e r e s t in 
the following described tract of land in Sa l t Lake County, 
State of Utah 
BEGINNING at a point in the center of Highland Drive on the 
projected North l i n e of Vine Stree t (6100 South), sa id 
point bem5* North 668.9 f e e t , more or l e s s , and West 215.3 
f e e t , more 6r l e s s , from the Southeast corner of Sect ion 16, 
Township 2 South, Range 1 East, Sa l t Lake Base and Meridian, 
and running thence North 0* 20' 50" East along center l i n e 
of Highland Drive 154.0 f e e t ; thence South 89# 15' 45" West 
197.17 f e e t ; thence South 0* 17' 45 ' West 154.0 f ee t t o North 
l i n e of Vine S tree t (6100 South); thence North 89* 15' 45" 
East along said North l i n e 197.03 fee t t o the point of beg in -
ning. 
EXCLJDING FROM sa id above described property that c e r t a i n 
property taken by Sal t Lake County as a part of the Col t o n -
wocd Expressway, Project S-0160-1, and p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s -
cribed as fo l l ows : Beginning at the i n t e r s e c t i o n of g iantors 
West property l i n e and cen ter l ine of survey at Enginee i ' s 
S ta t ion 176+92.29, which point i s North 668.90 f e e t and West 
484.09 f ee t from the Southeast corner of Said Sect ion 16; 
and tangency t o the curve of sa id Engineer's Stat ion 176+92.29 
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: the foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledge to 
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95 .41 f e e t , more or l e s s to grantors west boundary l i n e , the p lace of begin-
ning, Lees Tract deeded to Sa l t Lake County and S t r e e t . 
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VA 
Lester A. Perry 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Zions First National Bank v. Betty Pursell, 
Alexander and Lorin N. Pacey Civil Action No. 
232782 and William Blodgett, et ux. v. Zions 
First National Bank et al., Civil Action No. 
C85-3348 
Dear Mr. Perry: 
Enclosed please find a copy of the Promissory Note dated 
July 7, 1971 in the principal sum of $27f262.59 executed by Betty 
Pursell Alexander and Lorin N. Pace. As you may know, a Default 
Judgment was entered against Mr. Pace on March 3, 1976 for the 
principal amount of $31,064.52 plus interest at the rate of eight per 
cent, attorney's fees in the amount of $2500 and costs in the amount 
of $24.60. This Judgment was subsequently renewed on March 14, 1984 
in a case entitled "Zions First National Bank v. Lorin N. Pace", 
Civil Action No. C84-0299. The Judgment was subsequently satisfied 
by Mr. Pace on August 31, 1984. 
Please let me know if you need any additional information. 
Very truly yours, 
SRE/dt 
Enclosure 
1 1 
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, 27f?62^9 
/ ^ N PROMISSORY NOTE DLLATERAL — INDIVIDUALS AND PARTNERSHIP 
L*JIN N. PACE *c BEfTY FURSRLL 
^ ^ ^ ALEXAUDfcA 
'.tV» Salt Lake City 
-July 7,_ 19JLL 
Upon Demand AFTER DATE. FOR VALUE RECEIVED 
^.THE UNDERSIGNED, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, PROMISE TO PAY TO THE ORDER OF Z I O N S F I R S T N A T I O N A L B A N K , A NATIONAL A8SO -^ r 
CIATION. AT ITS Jtead OFFICE IN Salt Lake City I ^»v<-%v~ u r r i u t i n - . • - » 
Twenty Seven Thousand Two Hundred Sixty Two & 59/100 
I N UUVF*UL MONEY OF THE U N I T E D STATES WITH INTEREST THEREON IN LIKE MONEY AT THE RATE OF 4 10 
, UTAH, T H E GUM OF 
DOLLARS 
PER CENT PER ANNUM, 
I'V AFTER JUDGMENT. PAYABLE FROM DATE UNTIL PAID 
ll 
BOI B E F O R E AND 
3 I ' t * ' 
' If the bolder deems Itself insecure, or If default be made In payment of the principal or If the Interest be not paid when due. time being the essence hereof, 
then the enUre unpaid balance, with Interest as aforesaid, shall at the election of the holder hereof and without notice of satd election, at once become due and 
payable. 
i r t h t s note becomes In default as aforesaid, the undersigned. Jointly and severally, agree to pay to the holder hereof collection costs. Including reasonable 
attorneys' fees and legal expenses. In addition lo all other sums due hereunder 
The undersigned and all endorsers, sureties and guarantors hereof hereby Jointly and severally waive presentment for payment demand, protest, notice of pro-
test *nd of non-payment and of dishonor, and consent to extensions of time, renewals, waivers or modifications without notice and further consent to the release of 
any security., or any part thereof, with or without substitution 
/^] Tt\\% note la secured by* a /Security Agreement on file with Zlons First National Bank /I n 
_k No: __£< tB>» •P ?<r t-ia*H/v 
ee ei 
P. O. li^rSo'uth 3rd East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
C L > REV » 7 0 5M 
RENEWED: 
PHONE. 
fc____9> ^ / / . - . ^ /r,<V 
•,.V( *MU« /~J]^^^l /"-e-C 
'CSppp WamSBEBSBBBBSOi 
g*u krLUA" 
to 
LORIN N. PACE 
Attorney for Defendants Bet 
Raco Car Wash Systems, Inc 
431 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411 
Telephone: 328-9623 
M,r I* 
cell and 
«^£^>? 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM D. BLODGETT and 
FLORENCE G. BLODGETT, his wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JOE MARTSCH, BETTY PURCELL, aka 
BETTY PURCELL MARTSCH, DOYLE NEASE, 
RACO CAR WASH SYSTEMS, INC., a Utah 
corporation, WAYNE A. ASHWORTH, Trustee, 
KARL W. TENNEY, VALLEY BANK and TRUST 
COMPANY, a Utah banking corporation, 
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF IDAHO, N.A., 
STATE OF UTAH, and JOHN DOES 1 through 
10, 
Defendants. 
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO 
WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL 
Civil No. 223407 
A conflict of interest having developed, LORIN N. PACE, 
moves the above entitled Court for leave t o withdraw as Counsel 
in representation of Betty Purcell, aka Bettv^Surcell Martsch. 
£^ 
LORIN N. PACE 
Attorney at Law 
431 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING: I hereby certify that a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing M3TION and the attached NOTICE OF MOTION was 
mailed, postage prepaid, this /C day of March, 1976, to Donald 
Sawaya, Attorney for Defendant Ashworth, 2805 South State Street, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115; Harry D. Pugsley, Attorney for 
Defendant Martsch, Suite 400 315 East Second South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, 84111? Mr. Irving H. Biele, Attorney for Valley Bank & Trust 
Company and Tenney, 80 West Broadway, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84010? Raymond W. Gee, Attorney for Plaintiffs, 336 South 
Third East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
(Ar^^T^T^-
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John H. Allen 
CALLISTER, GREENE & NEBEKER 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
800 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone: 531-7676 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, 
Plaintiff, 
v s . 
C OMP L A t N T 
C?9- ltito 
Civil No. C-79-BETTY PURSELL ALEXANDER 
aka BETTY PURSELL MARTSCH, 
Defendant. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
Plaintiff complains of defendant and for cause of action alleges: 
1. On August 13, 1976, plaintiff obtained a judgment against defendant 
Betty Pursell Alexander in the District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, in 
the matter of Zions First National Bank vs . Betty Pursell Alexander, et a l . , Civil 
No. 232782. By virtue of that judgment, plaintiff has a lien upon all real property 
of defendant in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
2. Water Park Corporation, a Utah corporation, w as dissolved on 
September 30, 1977. On that date it was the owner of the following described real 
property located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, to-wit: 
Beginning at a point in the center of Highland Drive on 
the projected North line of Vine Street (6100 South) , said 
point being North 668.9 feet, more or less, and West 
215.3 feet, more or less , from the Southeast corner of 
Section 16, Township 2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian, and running thence North 0°20f50" 
East along center line of Highland Drive 154.0 feet; thence 
South 89°15,45" West 197.17 feet; thence South 0°17'45" 
West 154.0 feet to North line of Vine Street (6100 South); 
thence North 89°15T45" East along said North line 197.03 
feet to the point of beginning. 
14 
-2-
Excluding from said above-described property that 
certain property taken by Salt Lake County as a part 
of the Cottonwood Expressway, Project S-0160-1, and 
particularly described as follows: Beginning at the 
intersection of grantors West property line and center-
line of survey at Engineer's Station 176+92.29, which 
point is North 668.90 feet and West 484.09 feet from the 
Southeast corner of said Section 16; and tangency to the 
curve of said Engineer's Station 176+92.29 bearing South 
38°54140" East; thence North 116.0 feet to a point on a 
2367.0 foot radius curve to the right; thence Southeasterly 
along the arc of said curve a distance of 150.20 feet, more 
or less , to the North line of 6100 South Street; thence West 
along the North line of 6100 South Street 95.41 feet, more 
or less , to grantors West boundary line, the place of 
beginning, less Tract deeded to Salt Lake County and 
Street. 
3. Defendant was and is the sole shareholder of Water Park 
Corporation, and therefore is or will be the owner of the above-described real 
property. 
4. By virtue of the ownership of the above-described real property 
the same is subject to the judgment lien of plaintiff, and said lien should be 
foreclosed in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays that the court issue its Decree 
foreclosing plaintiffs judgment lien in accordance with the laws of the State of 
Utah, and for such other and further relief as the court deems proper. 
DATED this / ? day of March, 1979. 
CALLISTER, GREENE & NEBEKER 
( "J~&/y s<&&+ 
John H. Allen 
/^Attorney for Plaintiff 
800 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Plaintiffs address: 
One South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) " 
^ S j & T ' HAND MA StVdF ^ c w a y 
THIS £2£ D., c- —&M&rZ_.
 19 22 
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ITON, McCONKIE 
OYER & BOYLE 
rnuS?5] 
FILED III CIFSK'S C : \ 3 £ 
Salt U k e City. Utah 
JOSEPH C. RUST 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3680 
*Jg8%-~ 
L ,fyC, 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * 
WILLIAM T. BLODGETT and 
FLORENCE G. BLODGETT, his wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
ORDER TO CONSOLIDATE 
Civil No( 22 3407 )and 
No. T>TO~flt)17 
vs. 
JOE MARTSCH, et al., 
Defendants. 
AND 
WILLIAM T. BLODGETT and 
FLORENCE G. BLODGETT, his wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BETTY PURCELL a/k/a 
BETTY PURCELL MARTSCH, 
and WATER PARK CORPORA-
TION, a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
* * * * * * 
Plaintiffs' Motion to consolidate Case #C-78--8017 with 
Case #22 3407 having come on for hearing before the Honorable 
Judge Christine M. Durham on the 6th day of April, 1979 at the 
hour of 2:00 p.m. and the plaintiffs being represented by their 
counsel, Joseph C. Rust, and defendants Valley Bank & Trust 
and Tenney being represented by their counsel, Irving H. Biele, 
and none of the other defendants being present or represented 
and the court having heard the arguments of counsel, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that pursuant to Rule 4 2 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Case #C-78-8017 be and the same is 
hereby consolidated with Case #22 3407 to retain the presently 16 
scheduled trial date of May 21, 1979. Counsel for plaintiffs 
is hereby directed that a copy of the Amended Complaint filed 
in Case #C-78-8017 be served on counsel for defendants in case 
#223407.-
Dated t h i s ///A day of fyULyf/J' , 1979. ^ _ d a y jfytot/. 
Chr i s t i ne M. Durham, Judge 
AiTLt , . 
n~._ 
RTON * McCONKIE 
TTORNEYS AT LAW 
130 S THIRD EAST 
IT LAKE CITY. UTAH 
RUvifcb 
M-y I f| 143 ft.H ' 7 9 
W . l ' t -' * r**>NS.Ct.ERR 
JOSEPH C. RUST 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3680 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * 
WILLIAM D. BLODGETT and 
FLORENCE G. BLODGETT, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BETTY PURCELL aka 
BETTY PURCELL MARTSCH, 
and WATER PARK CORPORATION, 
a Utah Corporation, 
Defendants. 
AJJSX, A/0. 24**-
$-7~>?f- 9:0/ A.Li, 
JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT 
Civil No. 223^07^ 
and 
LI  
i<£c-78»8017^) 
* * * * * * 
In this action the defendant Water Park Corporation, 
having been regularly served with process, and having failed 
to appear and answer the plaintiffs' complaint filed herein, the 
legal time for answering having expired, and the default of the 
said defendant in the premises having been duly entered according 
to law, now upon application of said plaintiffs to the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, judgment is hereby 
entered against said defendant, in pursuance of the prayer of 
said complaint. 
WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
that all of the right, title and interest of defendant Water Park 
Corporation in and to that certain property in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah described in the complaint as parcel 1 and parcel 
2 and more specifically described on the attached Exhibits A and 
B, attached hereto and made a part hereof, be and the same is 
hereby conveyed and deeded over to plaintiffs William D. and 
Florence G. Blodgett, his wife. It is further ordered that all 
rental monies received by defendant Water Park Corporation from 
t h e s a i d p a r c e l 2 he p a i d o v e r t o p l a i n t i f f s t o g e t h e r w i t h 
i n t e r e s t t h e r e o n a t the i d l e of B% per annum t o g e t h e r w i t h s a i d 
)>T ri i nl i f Ts * i os I s rind di sbur semenl s i ii 1 he aim unL nL ,» 14 (III. 
Judgment l e i ide ied /YfeU/ / , 19 79 
UUc^Aty///j{A^L 
J n D r, r 
ATTEST nv, hand, <ii i ieal of said Court, this / day i f 
/Itibu , J 47'J. 
J &_8TERL1NG FVAN9 
By 
F i l e d 
11 n 
EXHIBIT A 
COMMENCING on the North line of Vine Street, 215.3 feet 
West and 66 8.9 feet North and South 89° 15f 45" West 
19 7.0 3 feet from the Southeast corner of Section 16, 
Township 2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, 
South 89° 15' 45" West 71.67 feet; North 0° 20' 50" East 
154 feet; North 89° 15' 45" East 71.53 feet; South 
0° 17' 45" West 154 feet to BEGINNING, less tract 
deeded to Salt Lake County. 
To include rights of egress and ingress to Highland 
Drive on both sides of the existing building and ex-
clude area occupied by sign to the west of existing 
building. 
EXHIBIT B 
BEGINNING at a point in the center of Highland Drive 
on the proiected North line of Vine Street (6100 South), 
said point beiag North 668,9 feet, more or less, and 
West 215.3 feet, more or less, from the Southeast corner 
of Section 16, Township 2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian, and running thence North 0° 20f 50H 
East along center line of Highland Drive 154.0 feet; 
thence South 89° 15' 45" West 197.1? feet; thence South 
0° 17* 45" West 154.0 feet to North line of Vine Street 
(6100 South); thence North 89° 15* 45" East along said 
North line 1H 7,1)3 feet to the point of Beginning„ 
EXCLUDING from said above described property that certain 
property taken by Salt Lake County as a part of I lu» 
Cottonwood Expressway,* Project S-0160-1, and particularly 
described as follows: Beginning at the intersection of 
grantors West property line and centerline of survey at 
Engineer's Station 176+92.29, which point is North 668,90 
feet and West 4 8 4.09 feet from the Southeast corner of 
said section 16; and tangency to the curve of said Engin-
eer's Station 176+92,29 bearing South 38° 54* 40" East; 
thence North 116.0 feet to a point of a 2367.0 foot radius 
curve to the right; thence Southeasterly along the arc of 
said curve a distance of 150.20 feet, more or less, to 
the North line of 6100 South Street; thence West along the 
North line of 6100 South Street 95.41 feet, more or less, 
to grantors west boundary line, the place of beginning. 
Less tract deeded to Salt Lake County and Street. 
0 1 
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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE - STATE OF UTAH 
Plain tfrf 
V$ 
D«1encfcnt 
M . N U T e O R D E R ^ ^ ^ 
Ti me: 
Date: £?<"<-. - 5 S ? 7 ? 
P. Atty ZT-,/2.r.r * , / ~ g - RL+sku\«J/ 
D.Attv /2L- ^ < ^ ~ A V ^ - U ; - l?/Ar/y 
rf^ ^ V ^ S > . 
£ A g LrvJ^T ^ 
J±^3t^sLcJL. 
J&*^2L 
ACTION TAKEN: 
LJ Default Judgment Summons 
Default of deft entered. 
Pltfs Counsel Sw & Ex 
Doc. proof offered, admitted & withdrawn 
Pltf is granted a Judgment as prayed. 
E r a s e d upon wpiwew stipulation of respective counsel, court orders:. 
Based upon motion of pltfs or defts counsel, court orders. 
Based on the failure of deft to appear in response to an order of the court and on motion of pltfs counsel, court orders 
/ shall issue for deft. Returnable Bail 
LJ Based on written stipulation of respective counsel/motion of plaintiff's counsel, and good cause appearing therefor, court orders the 
above case be and the same is hereby dismissed without predjudice. 
LJ Based on written motion of Pltfs counsel, court orders 
Deft to ans cone prop «n at _ _ _ _ _ _ 
D Based on _ . motion of pltfs counsel, court orders 
Deft to show cause on. 
Based on motion of pltfs counsel, pltfs. 
is amended and made returnable on 
LJ It appearing to the court that a writ of garnishment was issued in the proper form and an answer filed stating that the garnishee is 
indebted to the defendant. It is ordered that the defendant have and recover of the garnishee. 
STATE OF UTAH )
 fta 
COUNTV OF SALT LAKE } * * 
—V. THE UNDERSIGNED. CLERK OF THE DISTRJCi 
ccur.T OH SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAM, CO f- E."FEY 
CEHTIPY THAT THE AN>£*ED ANO rOPi 00*^3 '3 
A TRUE AtiD ,CUU. CC^Y C.= AN C«»C-!:v4M. DOCU-
MENT ON -1LE IN MY C?RCE AS SL'CM CL£S*$. 
WITNESS MY HAND AfiD SE«L OF SAID CC^ 
lH\$#fof DAY OF « - 19 
for the use and benefit of the plaintiff in the sum of $ . 
tjpw**.* >..„ 
fi«%.*t if 
KATIE L. DIXON. Recorder 
Salt Lake? County. Utah 
By 
nteoiK ciERICS oFrirf 
SALT uiu COUNTI.UUH 
Hud) HjUH'86 
m tkHidlL — uiv.ily J . . 0 I « , C 0 L , BT 
Lester A. Perry - A2571 
Robert M. Dyer - A0495 
KIRTON, McCONKIC & BUSHNELL 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3680 
3L.[,l'iy iUWh 
I N TIN: TII inn . n i n i r i n i , in . S T R I C T l o u i r r r im J.NI.T I.AKF < • OIJNTY 
STATE (II1 UTAH 
WILLIAM D. BLODGETT and 
FLORENCE G- BLODGETT, his * 
ORDER AMU JUDGMENT 
OF QUIET TITLE 
JOE MARTSCH, BETTi FUkCcLu, 
aka BETTY PURCELL MARTSCH, 
Defendants. 
Be it remembered that 
C-78-801 * *aated) 
* ** Order 
i MO f AST 
' LAKI enrv 
be%,if Honorable , 
May ^, x9 
record, u 
dant be i * i 
e 
pleadings _ ^e s1;^ b 
i % 
of Kin. i< 'tu^'.i 
*r s. t St ' ' 
*. * a ;.ed 
The court being fully advised in the premises and having 
considered the Motion of plaintiff hereby orders, adjudges and 
decrees: 
1. The Order of Dismissal against defendant Betty Purcell, 
llaka Betty Purcell Martsch, signed and entered Hay 5, 1980 by the 
Honorable Earnest F. Baldwin Jr., is hereby set aside. 
II 2. Judgment is hereby entered against Betty Purcell, aka 
Betty Purcell Martsch, qu-ieting Title of all right, title and 
interest of said defendant within the following identified real 
property in and to the plaintiffs', William D. Blodgett and Florence 
G. Blodgett* The real property to which this quiet title judgement 
applies is located within Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and is 
more particularly identified as: 
I Beginning at a point in the center of Highland Drive 
I on the projected North line of Vine Street (6100 South), 
I said point being North 668.9 feet, more or less, and 
I West 215.3 feet, more or less, from the Southeast 
II corner of Section 16, Township 2 South, Range 1 Bast, | Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence North 
tt 0°20950" East along center line of Highland Drive 154.0 | feet; thence south S g ^ U S " West 197.17 feet; thence South 
0o17l4511 West 154.0 feet to North line of Vine Street | (6100 South); thence North 89°15'45" Bast along said North 
line 197.03 feet to the point of beginnning. 
Excluding from said above-described property that certain 
property taken by Salt Lake County as a part of the 
Cottonwood Expressway, Project S-0160-1, and more part-
icularly described as follows: Beginning at the 
intersections of grantors West property line and centerline 
I of survey at Engineer's Station 176+92.29, which point is 
North 668.90 feet and West 484.09 feet from the Southeast 
corner of said Section 16; and tangency to the curve of said 
Engineer's Station 176+92.29 bearing South 38°54f40" East; 
u,r~n- H thence North 116.0 feet to a point on a 2367.0 foot radius 
MCvOmlt II 
Wi Corporflfeut II A 
300 EAST II — Z — 
J*t CITY U 
I. 300 EAST 
' LAKE CITY 
AH 04111 
I 
curv e to the rightj thence Southeasterly ale ng the arc of 
said curve a distance of 150.20 feet, more or less, to the 
North line of 6100 South Street; thence West along the North 
line of 6100 South Street 95.41 feet, more or less, to 
grantors West boundary line, the place of beginning 1 ess 
Tract deeded to Salt Lake County and Street. 
3 Thi s Order shall relate back lo amJ L" eiteetive as of 
May 5f 1980. 
Pur cell Martsch, Raco Car lash Systems, Inc.
 l( an fill 1 ater Park C :: rpor-
tiem dismissed i rejudice an: i 3 any and all 1  counter-
y dismissed with prejudice with 
the 
ea£* 
5. The cum of 
Dated tnis 
TTATBOfUTAH ) m 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) m 
i, rm uNOf*itGNio, cam or THE DUTWCT 
COU*T o# SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAK DO HIRSEY 
CWTtW THAT THE ANNEXED AND FOMGONG It 
A TRUE AND FULL COPY OF AN OKfGlk'AL DOOU-
M9MT ON FILE m MY OFFICE AS SUOH CtERK. 
WITNSS8 MY HAND ^O^EAL OF ftAfc) COURT 
[THIS JLS- DAY OF Jf%/^j/ajr it £& 
H. DtMQN^INttlEY, QL [BY Zrs22q2L 
ieposit 
Augusi 
BY THE COURT: 
iiie court. 
rid 'B." Dee, D i s t r i c t Judge 
ATTEST 
H.DIXON, 
%&<<* 
- 3 -
1090 Or. 709 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
PER CURIAM. 
Reversed and remanded for reconsidera' 
tion. 1000 Friends v. LCDC (A32117), 76 
Or.App. 33, 708 P.2d 370 (decided this 
date). 
(O fxiVNUMlfllttHMl 
76 0r.App.253 
Martha W. HOYT, Appellant, 
AMERICAN TRADERS, INC, a 
Washington corporation, 
Respondent 
84-1701-NJ-2; CA A33635. 
Court of Appeals of Oregon, 
In Banc 
Argued and Submitted Hay 13, 1985. 
Resubmitted In Banc Sept 11, 1985.* 
Decided Nov. 14, 1985. 
Reconsideration Denied Jan. 10,1986. 
Review Allowed Jan. 28,1986. 
Wife brought action for declaratory 
judgment that her parcel of real property, 
which was awarded solely to her in mar* 
riage dissolution decree, was free of judg-
ment lien filed against husband, who was 
former tenant by the entirety of parcel, 
dunrvfc petukflcy of divorce yraeeding*. 
The Jackson County Circuit Court, L.L. 
Sawyer, J., entered summary judgment for 
judgment creditor, and wife appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, Buttler, J., held that 
doctrine of lis pendens applied in divorce 
action such that wife's claim on parcel, I s 
reflected in divorce pleadings filed prior to 
judgment lien, was ahead of judgment 
creditor's lien. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Although this case was disposed of on the two 
motions for summary judgment, which seems 
questionable in a declarator, judgment action, 
there is no issue of material fact, the parties 
Richardson, J., dissented and filed 
opinion, in which Warden and Van Hoomis-
sen, JJ., joined. 
1. Lis Pendens *»16 
Doctrine of lis pendens applies in disso-
lution cases if property is described with 
particularity in a pleading. 
2. Lis Pendens *»25(1) 
Under doctrine of lis pendens, wife, 
who filed petition for marriage dissolution 
seeking sole title to real property held by 
wife and husband as tenants by the entire-
ty and who was ultimately awarded title to 
property in dissolution decree, took proper-
ty free of lien by husband's judgment cred-
itor, which filed judgment lien against hus-
band after wife filed dissolution petition. 
ORS 18.350, 93.740, 107.025, 107.036, 107.-
095(lXe). 
A.E. Piazza, Medford, argued the cause 
and filed the brief for appellant 
Richard A. Stark, Medford, argued the 
cause for respondent With him on the 
brief was Stark and Hanunack, Medford. 
BUTTLER, Judge. 
In this declaratory judgment action, 
plaintiff contends that her interest in a 
parcel of real property that was awarded to 
her in the decree dissolving her marriage 
should be free of the lien of a foreign 
judgment that defendant obtained against 
in the county where the property is located 
while the dissolution proceeding was pend-
ing. The trial court granted defendant's 
and denied plaintiffs motion for summary 
judgment1 and entered judgment accord-
ingly. Plaintiff appeals; we reverse. 
The only facta before the trial court were 
those to which the parties stipulated, which 
we summarize: Prior to March 20, 1980, 
plaintiff Martha W. Hoyt and Edwin R. 
having stipulated to the relevant facts. The only 
question presented was a legal one, and we treat 
the case as having been tried on stipulated facts. 
HOYT v. AMERICAN TRADERS, INC 
Clt* M 709 FJd 1090 (OrJkpp. 1*85) 
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Hoyt were husband and wife and the own-
ers of certain real property as tenants by 
the entirety, described as follows, to-wit 
"Lot 1 in Block 8 of ROGUE VALLEY 
ESTATES SUBDIVISION in Jackson 
County, Oregon, according to the Official 
Plat thereof, now of record." 
On March 20,1980, plaintiff filed a petition 
for dissolution of her marriage and re-
quested, among other things, that the real 
property, which was specifically described, 
be awarded to her as her sole and separate 
property. 
On April 26, 1980, plaintiffs husband 
was served personally with a summons and 
the petition, and on July 16, 1980, defend-
ant, American Traders, Inc., obtained a 
judgment against the husband in the Supe-
rior Court of Snohomish County, Wash-
ington, in the amount of $601,951.52. On 
August 20, 1980, defendant caused that 
judgment to be registered in Jackson Coun-
ty, Oregon, in accordance with the provi-
sions of ORS chapter 24. On April 27, 
1981, a decree of dissolution of the Hoyt 
marriage was entered, which, among other 
things, awarded plaintiff, as her sole and 
separate property, all right, title and inter-
est in the described real property and spe-
cifically provided that the decree operated 
as a deed of conveyance of that property 
There are no issues of fact presented; 
the only issue is one of law—whether the 
doctrine of lis pendens applies in dissolu-. 
tk>n cases. Defendant's judgment did not 
become a lien on plaintiffs husband's inter 
est in real property in Jackson County until 
it was registered there, ORS 18.350, after 
the dissolution action was commenced, If 
lis pendens does apply, the judgment lien 
would be subject to the outcome of the 
dissolution proceeding; because the decree 
awarded the property to plaintiff, her inter-
est would be ahead of defendant's lien, If 
lis pendens does not apply, defendant pre-
vails, because its judgment lien against 
plaintiffs husband's interest was of record 
before the property was awarded to plain-
tiff. 
In Slauson v. Usher, 89 Or.App. 303, 592 
P.2d 247, rev. den. 287 Or, 129 (1979), we 
discussed, but did not decide, the question 
presented here; we noted: 
"As an alternative to his principal ar-
gument, plaintiff contends that the doc-
trine of lis pendens should be extended to 
dissolution proceedings which, under 
ORS 107.105(lXe) make all property of 
the parties subject to distribution by the 
court Twice, prior to the enactment of 
ORS 107.105(lXe), the Supreme Court de-
clined to decide whether lis pendens ap-
plies in dissolution cases. Houston v. 
Timmerman, 17 Or 499, 21 P 1037, 11 
AS 848, 4 LRA 716 (1889); and Burnett 
et ai v. Hatch, 200 Or 291, 266 P2d 414 
(1954). The enactment of ORS 107.-
105(lXe) created logical reasons both for 
applying lis pendens to dissolution cases 
and for rejecting the doctrine's applica-
tion. The trial court has jurisdiction over 
all property of the parties under that 
statute, and the argument for applying 
lis pendens to dissolution proceedings is, 
for that reason, more compelling than 
was the case when Houston and Burnett 
were decided. The property is now auto-
matically a 'subject' of a dissolution suit 
However, the court's plenary authority 
to distribute the parties' property also 
has the effect of eliminating the need for 
the petitioner to specify in his pleadings 
what property of his spouse he claims. 
The absence of such specification is in-
consistent with the application of lis pen-
dens under prior interpretations of the 
doctrine. See Walker v. Goldsmith, 14 
Or 125,12 P 537 (1886); Burnett et al v. 
Hatch, supra; and Annotation, 166 ALR 
406. Because we decide this appeal in 
favor of plaintiff on other grounds, we 
too decline to reach the question of 
whether lis pendens applies to dissolution 
cases and, if so, what pleading require-
ments would be necessary to invoke the 
doctrine." 89 Or.App. at 808 n. 3, 592 
P.2d 247. (Emphasis in original) 
11J We must now decide the question 
we left open in Slauson and we hold that 
the doctrine of lis pendens does apply in 
dissolution cases if the property is de-
scribed with particularity in a pleading In 
i-'V 
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Houston v. Timmerman, 17 Or. 499, 21 P. 
1037, 11 AS 848, 4 LRA 716 (1889), the 
court set forth two requirements for the 
applicability of the doctrine: 
««» * * ^v/0 t|ung8> however, seem in-
dispensable to give [lis pendens] effect 
1. That the litigation must be about some 
specific thing, which must necessarily be 
affected by the termination of the suit; 
and 2. That the particular property in-
volved in the suit 'must be so pointed out 
by the proceeding as to warn the whole 
world that they intermeddle at their per-
il/ • • • " 17 Or at 504, 21 P. 1037. 
(Citation omitted.) 
The dissolution'action involved here met 
both requirements. The first requirement 
is that the litigation must be about some 
specific thing, which must necessarily be 
affected by the termination of the action. 
We do not understand that requirement to 
be that the litigation be only about one 
specific thing; it is enough that the owner-
ship of that specific thing (the particularly 
described real property) necessarily be in-
volved in the litigation. Here, plaintiff, as 
the wife in the dissolution proceeding, de-
scribed the real property and prayed that it 
be awarded to her. Accordingly, the dispo-
sition of that real property had to be affect-
ed by the termination of that proceeding; it 
had to be awarded to one or both of the 
parties. The second requirement is that 
the particular property "must be so pointed 
out by the proceedings as to warn the 
whole world that they intermeddle at their 
peril" That was done here. 
The dissent argues that the first require-
ment can never be met in a dissolution 
proceeding, because the litigation is not 
about particular property. Although there 
was a time when it was the status of the 
parties that was the subject of divorce pro-
ceedings and, once it was determined that 
one of the parties was entitled to a divorce, 
certain property consequences followed as 
a matter of law, see Houston v. Timmer-
many supra, that is no longer true. Either 
party is entitled to dissolve the marriage 
without regard to fault, ORS 107.025,107.-
036, and the only issues, other than the 
custody of children, are economic—support 
and property division. Accordingly, in dis-
solution cases in which there is property to 
be divided, the litigation is about property 
and, if the real property is particularly 
described, it is about particular real proper-
ty. 
The dissent also argues that there is no 
certainty that any particular property of a 
party or the parties necessarily will be af-
fected. It is true that one cannot deter-
mine in advance who will be awarded par-
ticular property; however, all of the prop-
erty will be af f ected in the sense that it will 
be awarded to one or both of the parties. 
Furthermore, when, as here, one of the 
parties describes particular property and 
prays that it be awarded to him or her, the 
court must necessarily dispose of that 
claim. Accordingly, the Houston require-
ments were satisfied. 
The broader policy question is whether 
lis pendens ought to apply to dissolution 
proceedings. As the dissent points out, it 
is not necessary to describe specific real 
property in the pleadings in dissolution 
cases, because the court necessarily divides 
the property between the parties "as may 
be just and proper in all the circumstanc-
es." ORS 107.105(lXf). Therefore, the dis-
sent argues, if we were to apply lis pen-
dens when a petition contains "superfluous 
•property descriptions/' "the practical effect 
would be a tail-wagging-the-dog phenome-
non in which descriptions would be included 
in petitions, not because of any relevance 
they have to the dissolution process, but 
for the sole purpose of making lis pendens 
applicable." That objection seems to us to 
be the precise reason for applying lis pen-
dens. We perceive no reason why either of 
the spouses should not be entitled to put 
everyone in the world on notice that people 
may deal with the property only at their 
peril 
That protection is particularly important 
with respect to judgments against one of 
them that become liens after the tosoto" 
tion proceedings are commenced. ORS 93.-
HOYT v. AMERICAN TRADERS, INC. 
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740 s permits any party to an action in 
which the title or any interest in real prop-
erty is involved to file with the recorder of 
deeds of any county in which any part of 
the property lies, other than the one in 
which the action is brought, a notice of lis 
pendens. From the time of filing, "pur-
chasers and incumbrancers" are on notice 
of the rights and equities in the property of 
the party filing the notice. There is noth-
ing in the statute that even suggests that it 
does not apply to dissolution proceedings. 
By its terms, it does apply and we perceive 
no reason why it should not be applied.1 
The application of lis pendens would 
make it more difficult for parties to a disso-
lution proceeding to alienate real property 
in an attempt to remove it from the dissolu-
tion court's jurisdiction. Although it is 
true that the dissolution court has authori-
ty to enjoin either party from encumbering 
or disposing of any property, ORS 107.-
095(1X6), an order issued pursuant to that 
authority does not, and cannot, cure the 
problem presented in this case: husband's 
judgment creditor obtaining a lien against 
the property before the dissolution court 
has awarded it to one party or the other. 
Because protection against such judgments 
k one of the functions of lis pendens, 
there is every reason to apply it here. 
[21 We hold that the doctrine ©f Its 
pendens was applicable to plaintiffs disso-
lution proceeding, as a result of which de-
fendant's judgment lien was subject to the 
outcome of that proceeding. When plain-
1 ORS 93 740 prowdoi: 
I n all suits in which the title to or any 
interest in or lien upon reil property is in 
volved, affected or brought in question, any 
party thereto at the commencement of the 
suit, or at any time during the pendency 
thereof, may file of record with the county 
clerk or other recorder of deeds of every 
county in which any part of the premises lies, 
except in the county in which the suit is 
brought, a notice of the pendency of the ac-
tion containing the names of the parties, the 
object of the suit, and the description of the 
real property in the county involved, affected, 
or brought in question, signed by the party or 
bis attorney. From the time of filing the 
notice, and from that time only, the pendency 
tiff was awarded the property free of her 
husband's interest, defendant lost its lien 
Reversed and remanded for entry of a 
judgment not inconsistent with this opinion. 
RICHARDSON, J., dissents 
RICHARDSON, Judge, dissenting. 
I would hold that the common law doc-
trine of lis pendens is inapplicable to disso-
lution cases, and I therefore respectfully 
dissent from the majority's holding that the 
doctrine applies to the dissolution proceed-
ing on which plaintiff bases this action. 
The court said in Houston v. Timmer-
man, 17 Or. 499, 21 P. 1037 (1889): 
•i» • • ipwo things however, seem in-
dispensable to give [lis pendens] effect 
1. That the litigation must be about some 
specific thing, which must necessarily be 
affected by the termination of the suit; 
and 2. That the particular property in-
volved in the suit 'must be so pointed out 
by the proceeding as to warn the whole 
world that they intermeddle at their per-
il/ • • • " 17 Or. at 804-05, 21 P. 1037. 
(Citation omitted.) 
The majority reasons that dissolution cases 
as a class meet the first of those tests, 
because all of the parties' property is sub-
ject to division. The majority then con-
cludes that the particular dissolution pro-
ceeding involved here satisfies the second 
Houston test, because plaintiff described 
the property in her dissolution petition and 
asked that it be awarded to her. I disagree 
with the majority on both points. 
of the suit is notice, to purchasers and incum-
brancers, of the rights and equities in the 
premises of the party filing the notice. The 
notice shall be recorded in the same book and 
In the same manner in which mortgages are 
recorded, and may be discharged in like man-
ner as mortgages are discharged, either by 
such party or the attorney signing the notice." 
3. Hie dissent's objection that our decision will 
require attorneys to describe "every item of 
property"' in the pleadings in order to avoid 
concern for malpractice claims is overstated. 
Only real property is subject to lis pendens, and 
all of the real property must be particularly 
described at some point in the proceedings. 
Why not in the pleadings? 
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It is correct, as a generality, that alt 
property of the parting spouses is subject 
to judicial allocation and distribution when 
a marriage is dissolved. However, the first 
Houston test requires that, for lis pendens 
to be invoked, there must be litigation 
about particular property and that the 
property will necessarily be affected by 
the result of the litigation. The requisite 
particularity and certainty of impact are 
absent in dissolution cases. The majority 
has extended the lis pendens doctrine to 
property if there is a chance that interests 
in it will be affected by a pending proceed-
ing. The majority's application of lis pen-
dens here is little more supportable, if at 
all, than it would be to apply the doctrine to 
the real property of a tort defendant on the 
chance that the result of the action might 
be that the property will be levied on to 
exonerate a judgment debt I do not agree 
that the underlying dissolution proceeding 
here or any other dissolution proceeding 
can come within the first Houston test 
I have even greater problems with the 
majority's conclusion that the dissolution 
proceeding involved in this case satisfies* 
the second Houston test by virtue of plain-
tiff describing the property in her petition 
and requesting that the domestic relations 
Court award it to her. Under the relevant 
statutory scheme, dissolution petitions do 
not have to contain such specific descrip-
tions and specific requests, see ORS 107.-
085, and, when they do, the specification is 
legally meaningless in the context of the 
dissolution procedure. Courts in dissolu-
tion cases must make a comprehensive allo-
cation of the property of the parties and 
the contents of petitions have no bearing 
on that judicial responsibility. See ORS 
107.105(lXe), (f). The majority's holding 
that lis pendens applies in dissolution 
cases if the petitions contain superfluous 
property descriptions creates a tail-wag-
t, I note, too, that the holding can have the effect 
of making Us pendens applicable to tome disso-
lution cases, but not to others in which specific 
property is not described in the pleading. That 
effect is hardly salutary, given the already sensi-
tive relationship between the need of the judi-
cial system to preserve the subject matter of 
litigation and the desirability of giving persons 
ging-the-dog phenomenon in which descrip-
tions wfll be included in petitions not be-
cause of any relevance they have to the 
dissolution process but for the sole purpose 
of making lis pendens applicable. 
The majority's conclusion not only con 
distort and complicate the dissolution pro-
cess in the way I have described; it neces-
sarily will do so. In the wake of the 
majority's holding, no competent lawyer 
who has any concern about malpractice will 
be able to refrain from including a specific 
description in every dissolution petition 
filed of every item of property in which 
either or both of the parties may have an 
interest The legislative objective of sim-
plifying dissolution pleadings and proce-
dures will be completely subverted by to* 
day's holding.1 
The systematic cost that the holding will 
cause is offset by only one gain, and the 
gain is academic. Lis pendens does have 
the effect of impeding or remedying at-
tempts to alienate property before a court's 
disposition of the property takes effect 
That result is desirable, but lis pendens is 
not necessary as an addition 1» the proce-
dures that are already available to accom-
plish it in dissolution cases. See; e,g.t ORS 
107.095(lXe); Slauson v. Usher, 39 Or. 
App. 303, 592 P.2d 247, rev. den. 287 Or. 
129 (1979). 
WARDEN and VAN HOOMISSEN, JX, 
join in this dissent 
(o iMYNUMMIlttUMl 
acquiring interests in property the greatest pos-
sible certainty as to where they must l**^*0 
determine whether the property is encumbered. 
Compare Land Associates v. Becker, 294 Or. 308, 
313-14, 656 P.2d 927 (1982), with Fremont in-
demnity Ca v. Corbett, 66 Or .App. 668, 674, 675 
?2d 1097, rev. den. 297 Or. 340. 6S3 P-2d 1370 
(1984) (Richardson, J., concurring). 
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